Essays in Industrial Organization by Miller, Keaton
Essays in Industrial Organization
a dissertation
submitted to the faculty of the graduate school
of the university of minnesota
by
Keaton Stanley Miller
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
doctor of philosophy
Amil Petrin, Adviser
June 2015
c© Keaton Stanley Miller 2015
Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank my committee, Amil Petrin, Thomas Holmes, Robert Town, and Joel
Waldfogel for their support and encouragement. Thanks to Kailin Clarke, Boyoung
Seo, Ethan Clarke, Thomas Youle, Thomas Quan, Dominic Smith, Matt Shapiro,
Bitmaro Kim and the members of the Minnesota IO Workshop for helpful comments
and suggestions. Thanks to Michael Chernew, Harvard Medical School, John Keifer
and Jake Barney for data. This work was supported in part by the University of
Minnesota Supercomputing Institute.
i
Abstract
In two essays, we examine several problems in industrial organization. In the first
essay, we study the effectiveness of partially-privatized Medicare by estimating the
costs that private firms face when providing care equivalent to that of the public
sector. In contrast to previous studies, we take a dynamic approach, driven by the
idea that consumers face large switching costs. We find that private firms face higher
costs than the government after adjusting for patient characteristics and generosity
of benefits. The second essay focuses on the effectiveness of U.S. merger policy by
studying the acquisition behaviors of cable telecommunication companies. We con-
struct a novel dataset of acquisitions in the cable industry from 2000-2012 and find
the Hart-Scott-Rodino disclosure threshold only affects firm behavior when acquiring
firms with overlapping geographic coverage areas.
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Chapter 1
Do private Medicare firms have
lower costs?
1.1 Introduction
Medicare, the U.S. federal health insurance program for seniors, provides a stan-
dard level of coverage for hospital and medical expenses with several well-known gaps
(Moon et al., 2000). Seeking to improve the welfare of seniors by expanding the avail-
able choices to fill these gaps, Congress introduced a partial-privatization program
known as Medicare Advantage (MA). Under this policy, the government offers subsi-
dies to private insurers, who then offer Medicare-replacement plans to seniors during
an open enrollment period each year. These plans are required to cover the same
services as Medicare covers, but may offer some additional benefits, such as coverage
for dental or vision services.1 To help pay for these benefits, firms may charge a
premium on top of the subsidy they receive from the government. Today, over 30%
of eligible seniors are enrolled in a MA plan.
Proponents of the program point to the prevalence of supplemental benefits as
proof that the program is welfare enhancing. Additionally, private insurers may face
1The Medigap program offers insurance that solely supplements traditional Medicare. In contrast,
MA plans replace traditional Medicare benefits and also provide supplemental benefits.
1
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lower costs than the government for traditional Medicare benefits through superior
negotiation with local providers and “managed-care” restrictions, such as referral and
network requirements.2 Detractors have voiced concerns about the high administra-
tive costs of the program and the relative value of the supplemental benefits offered
to consumers (Pear and Bogdanich, 2003).
In this work, I study the overall welfare of the MA program taking into account
the subsidies paid to firms by the government, the supplemental benefits offered, firm
costs, and traditional Medicare expenditures. Currently, the subsidies are set at a
level higher than Medicare’s average costs. At the same time, almost all plans provide
additional benefits beyond those of traditional Medicare. Therefore, to compare the
programs, I must put them on an equal footing and estimate both the cost to firms
of providing Medicare-equivalent benefits as well as the consumer welfare generated
by the supplemental benefits.
I follow the literature3 and employ a revealed preference approach: I construct
a model of supply and demand for Medicare Advantage and estimate the model’s
parameters using panel data on consumers and plans from 2008-2010. I use detailed
information on traditional Medicare expenditures to compare the costs of MA plans
to Medicare’s cost. In contrast to previous work on Medicare Advantage, I allow for
the presence of switching costs on the demand side to impact firm behavior in an
imperfectly competitive environment, which requires a dynamic model. To achieve
tractibility, I extend the Oblivious Equilibrium concept of Weintraub et al. (2008) to
models with switching costs.
I find that, on average, firms spend $5,293 per year to insure a healthy individual
and $14,609 to insure an unhealthy individual when they provide Medicare-equivalent
2Medicare is organized as a Fee-For-Service system, whereas most Medicare Advantage plans are
offered by Preferred Provider Organziations or Health Maintenance Organizations. The Medicare
Advantage system is largely based on the idea of managed competition promulgated by Enthoven
(1978).
3See, for example, Curto et al. (2014); Lustig (2011)
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coverage. In contrast, Medicare spends an average of $4,390 on healthy individuals
and $11,453 on unhealthy individuals. While these costs are higher than Medicare’s
costs, they are below the average subsidy rate ($5,826 for healthy individuals and
$16,419 for unhealthy individuals), allowing firms to capture significant profits despite
the presence of many competitors. On average, firms spend $184 on supplemental
benefits, generating an average of $328 in welfare for individuals enrolled in their
plans.
My findings are driven by the interactions between several relevant market fea-
tures, including large switching costs. Miller et al. (2014, hereafter MPTC) use a
comprehensive panel survey of Medicare recipients along with detailed information
on plan features to estimate the demand for MA plans and find seniors who wish
to switch plans incur a cost of up to $1,300, well above the mean annual premium
of $825. These switching costs are largely driven by network restrictions: switching
insurance providers often involves establishing relationships with an entirely new set
of care-givers. The existence of switching costs implies that a firm’s current cus-
tomer base is a large determinant of its future profits (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007).
Firms therefore face an intertemporal tradeoff between “locking in” customers with
attractive but relatively unprofitable plans and “harvesting” their market share with
unattractive but more profitable offerings.4
In addition to switching costs, the MA market is characterized by a high degree
of heterogeneity in health among seniors, which, when combined with a require-
ment that firms offer the same products at the same prices to all seniors, leads to
adverse selection: firms have an incentive to enroll the most profitable individuals
through careful management of plan prices and benefits. To address this incentive,
4By default, seniors are automatically re-enrolled in their current plan if they take no action
during the open enrollment period. While there are restrictions on the changes firms can make to
their set of offered plans each year, they essentially amount to a requirement that the rank-ordering
of plans with respect to price stays constant. In other words, a firm can raise prices on its enrollees
from year-to-year and those enrollees must take action in order to avoid these price increases.
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the Medicare Advantage system adjusts the payments offered to firms based upon the
characteristics of each of their enrollees. These adjustments, however, are based upon
Medicare’s expenditures on individuals with similar characteristics. If firm costs differ
from Medicare’s costs unevenly, firms will still have an incentive to enroll particular
groups of individuals.5
Finally, unlike the highly regulated Medigap program, MA firms may offer a wide
variety of supplemental benefits on top of the minimum “package” required by law.
Firms may set a number of parameters for their plans, ranging from the number of
days patients are allowed to spend in the hospital per year to the copay for primary
care visits. Most firms offer more than one plan with a range of prices and character-
istics to appeal to individuals with different preferences. Since these plans generally
use the same network, firms must worry about potential self-cannibalization: if a
lower priced plan is too generous, consumers may switch.
My model incorporates these features into a dynamic environment with imperfect
competition. In the model, consumers are described by their health status and a
number of demographic characteristics. They face a discrete choice between a num-
ber of different plans defined by a price and a generosity index. Choices that require
consumers to change insurance providers incur a switching cost. Firms choose prod-
uct characteristics for multiple plans and take into account the dynamic incentives
generated by the switching costs. Firms face marginal costs and subsidies that vary
according to the demographics and health of their enrollees.
I estimate the model in two steps. First, I estimate the demand-side parameters
largely following the procedure outlined in MPTC. which in turn is based on the
discrete choice literature (Berry, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004).
5For example, suppose there are two health conditions in the market. Condition A costs firms
$200 to treat and condition B costs firms $500 to treat. The risk-adjusted payments to firms for
individuals with conditions A and B are $250 and $700, respectively. Since condition B is more
profitable for firms, they have an incentive to use whatever information they have about demand to
attract individuals with condition B.
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In the second stage, I form moments from the model’s predictions of optimal firm
behavior and compare them to their sample equivalents to estimate the parameters
of the firms’ cost function (Newey and McFadden, 1994). I take advantage of the fact
that the government pays firms different subsidies for similar individuals in different
counties to assist in identifying county-level parameters.
My cost estimates are driven by the combination of factors, including the price
elasticity of demand and the size of the switching costs. In some sense, the existence
of switching costs creates a group of consumers over which the firm faces far less com-
petition. In the preferred specification, these factors combine with the intertemporal
dynamics to determine the markup the firm can set. The preferred estimates differ
significantly from those obtained with a static version of my model. If switching costs
are ignored on the demand side, the estimated costs are up to 20% lower than the
preferred specification. This result is largely driven by the low enrollment rate: a
majority of seniors in my sample never enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan. The
absence of switching costs biases the rest of the demand system and generates a much
lower mean price elasticity. This in turn implies the premiums I observe are marked
up well above firm costs.
On the other hand, if switching costs are included but firms are assumed to be
myopic, the estimated costs are up to 25% higher. This is driven by the connection
between market share and firm behavior. When firms are myopic, they will freely
charge high prices without regard to what effects those prices will have on their future
market power. The inclusion of the dynamic incentive dampens that connection.
In a counterfactual simulation, I explore the impact of a 50% reduction in the
switching costs incurred by consumers. This increased “fluidity” in the demand sys-
tem implies that firms with a low market share don’t need to offer plans that are as
attractive as the baseline to win customers. In equilbrium, firms with larger shares
respond to this change by lowering the attractiveness of their plans as well – as the
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competitive pressure they face has weakened. As the plans in the market become less
attractive, consumers respond by leaving – the overall Medicare Advantage enroll-
ment rate is almost cut in half. The exodus is biased: the consumers that remain in
Medicare Advantage are less healthy than those in the baseline scenario, which leads
to higher mean per-enrollee profits for firms. Given the relatively low value consumers
place on the supplemental benefits offered by MA plans, the change increases overall
welfare by 8%, driven by the movement of consumers from expensive MA plans to
cheaper Medicare Fee-for-Service (FFS) benefits.
A second counterfactual explores the effect of a 5% reduction in the subsidies
offered to firms, similar to the policy included in the Affordable Care Act (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2014). The change in subsidies implies that zero-premium plans
are no longer profitable for firms. Firms stop offering these plans and reduce the
attractiveness of their remaining plans to compensate for the reduced subsidies. These
effects combine to produce a drastic reduction in MA enrollment, consumer welfare
and total firm profits. These reductions, however, are more than offset by a large
reduction in total Medicare expenditures.
I simplify firms’ information and action sets to achieve computational tractibility.
Instead of explicitly tracking the full states and actions of each of their competitors,
firms keep track of the average ‘competitive environment’ they face. This approach is
similar to the Oblivious Equilibrium concept of Weintraub et al. (2008); though I allow
for a continuous state space and firms in the model keep track of detailed information
on the effect of competitors’ actions on individuals across the demographic spectrum.6
Instead of modelling each feature of plans, I follow Lustig (2011) and use a generosity
index to measure the relative desirability of different combinations of benefits.
This paper contributes to the literature on private Medicare plans and competition
6Qi (2013) uses an alternative modification of the Oblivious Equilibrium concept to estimate a
model of dynamic oligopoly in cigarette advertising.
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within health care, an area reviewed by Gaynor and Town (2011). Curto et al. (2014)
also estimate costs for MA firms. They estimate a logit demand model and firm
costs under the assumption that the subsidy system perfectly captures the relative
heterogeneous risk of enrollees. Duggan et al. (2014) study the effect of changes in the
subsidies offered to firms in particular metropolitan areas. Aizawa and Kim (2013)
study the effect of advertising on demand for MA plans in a static setting, taking
into account the risk-adjustment system.
The concept of switching costs I use is broadly related to the literature on con-
sumer inertia in health. Ho et al. (2014) study consumer inertia in the Medicare Part
D (prescription drug) market and calculate a static counterfactual environment in
which inertia is removed. They find, as I do, the elimination of interia would lead
to substantial savings for both consumers and the government. Abaluck and Gruber
(2013) also study Medicare Part D and focus on decomposing observed consumer
inertia into demand- and supply-side factors. They find little improvement in the
ability of consumers to choose plans over time. Handel (2013) studies the interaction
between inertia and selection in employer-provided insurance and finds that a reduc-
tion in inertia leads to increased selection. Cebul et al. (2011) study search frictions
in the commercial insurance market and find that frictions increase premiums and
insurance turnover.
My results on the relative profitability of different types of individuals are similar
to those of Brown et al. (2011), who use data on Medicare expenditures to understand
the changes in incentives brought about by the introduction of the risk adjustment
system used by the government to compute Medicare Advantage payments. They
find the risk adjustment system significantly increased the profitibility of unhealthy
people and led firms to change their selection patterns. Newhouse et al. (2014) futher
examines the current behavior of Medicare Advantage plans and finds evidence of
selection.
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Finally, I contribute to the empirical study of dynamic firm behavior in envi-
ronments with endogenous product characteristics, an area reviewed by Crawford
(2012). My estimation procedure allows firms to simultaneously choose character-
istics of a “line-up” of plans each period. Many recent studies of firm behavior7
use two-step estimators in which policy and transition functions are estimated semi-
or non-parametrically and structural parameters are recovered separately;8 however,
given the number of covariates I include, my sample is too small to reliably estimate
the transition matrix. Instead, I compute the information sets of firms directly from
the data and solve a single firm problem.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
history and description of the Medicare Advantage program. Section 3 introduces my
model of dynamic competition. Section 4 describes my data. Section 5 details the
empirical implementation of my model including details of estimation, counterfactual,
and computation. Results are described in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Medicare Advantage
Medicare was created in 1965 to address the lack of health insurance among senior
citizens.9 While the original law provided basic hospital (Part B) and medical (Part
B) insurance to seniors (age 65 or older), reforms have slowly expanded Medicare’s
role within the U.S. health care system. Eligibility was extended to individuals under
65 with certain disabilities and illnesses. The range of services covered by the program
increased. These expansions had a serious impact on the cost of the program. In 1970,
Medicare composed about 0.5% of GDP. By 1980, Medicare had more than doubled
7For examples, see Ryan (2012); Collard-Wexler (2013); Youle (2014)
8For examples, see Hotz and Miller (1993); Bajari et al. (2007); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007);
Pakes et al. (2007)
9Much of the historical information in this section is compiled from http://www.cms.gov/
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in size to 1.1% of GDP.10
This growth led policy-makers to begin experimenting with different cost-containment
and care-delivery strategies in the 1980s. While many efforts focused on broad re-
forms, such as changing the way Medicare reimbursed care-givers, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, then known as the Health Care Financing
Administration) began a series of limited trial programs based in part on the ideas
of Enthoven (1978) in which the government contracted with Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) to manage the care of select groups of enrollees.
HMOs, which had become popular after the passage of the Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973, provided health care to their customers under a funda-
mentally different model. Previously, most health insurance was operated under a
Fee-for-Service (FFS) model, in which doctors charged patients and insurers for each
individual service performed. Given the level of asymmetric information present in
the doctor-patient relationship, many feared the system made it too easy for doctors
to perform unnecessary procedures (Arrow, 1963; Chernew, 2003). HMOs changed
that by signing pre-paid contracts with physicians and hospitals (Markovich, 2003).
Today, HMOs take advantage of a number of other components of the so-called
managed care model (Glied, 2000). Patients are generally required to see a primary
care physician for a referral before they can visit a more expensive specialist. Pre-
ventative care is usually provided at little-to-no charge to enrollees with the idea
that regular checkups can detect illnesses before expensive procedures are necessary.
HMOs regularly review the performance of their doctors to ensure the number of
services they each perform are in line with expectations. Preferred Provider Organi-
zations (PPOs) have arisen as a slightly more flexible but more expensive alternative
(Gabel et al., 1988).
10See http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.
html for information on health care spending in the U.S.
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The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 expanded and formalized the Medicare managed
care program into Part C. The new program closely followed common models of
employer-provided health insurance and had several key components. Each spring,
firms submitted county-by-county plan proposals to CMS. CMS verified that the
plans met the minimum requirements and covered the same conditions as Medicare,
though many plans chose to offer additional benefits. In the fall, CMS operated an
open-enrollment period, during which Medicare recipients could freely choose between
original Medicare or any of the plans available in their county of residence. Coverage
began on January 1st, and firms received a flat subsidy from CMS, known as a
capitation payment, each month (CMS, 2014).
After several enrollment periods passed, policy-makers grew concerned about the
direction of the program (Pear and Bogdanich, 2003). Entry by firms was largely
limited to suburban areas and many rural and inner-city residents did not have access
to the new plans. Additionally, since the capitation payment was the same for all
enrollees, firms had an incentive to tailor their plans to appeal to only the healthiest
(and therefore most profitable) consumers. Enrollment hovered around 15% of eligible
seniors, or six million people (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2014).
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
sought to address these concerns by reforming Part C. Plan providers were given
new flexibility to manage the care of their enrollees – particularly with respect to
the provision of non-emergency care. The subsidies offered to plans were significantly
increased to encourage entry in more geographic areas. Finally, the reimbursement
system became risk-adjusted. Under the new system, firms submit demographic and
diagnostic information about their enrollees each month. CMS “scores” each enrollee’s
risk according to the cost of similar individuals enrolled in the traditional Medicare
system – the average senior has a risk score of 1.0. CMS sets a benchmark rate for
each county and multiplies this rate by the individual risk score for each enrollee to
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determine the subsidies paid to firms (CMS, 2014).
The changes have had the desired effects: now almost all seniors have the option
of at least one Medicare Advantage plan and most can choose between two or more
(in addition to traditional Medicare). Studies of the risk adjustment system have
concluded that it effectively reduced the tendency of firms to prefer healthy enrollees
(Brown et al., 2011). Enrollment surged and today over 30% of seniors, almost 16
million people, are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan (Kaiser Family Foundation,
2014).
1.3 Model
Taking these institutional details into account, I build a model of supply and demand
for Medicare Advantage. On the demand side, heterogeneous consumers face a dis-
crete choice of plans described by a price and a generosity index. They incur a cost if
they switch insurers. Following Handel (2013), I assume consumers are myopic and
do not take into account future switching costs.11 On the supply side, symmetric
firms simultaneously choose the price and generosity of multiple plans. They solve a
recursive value function that takes into account the dynamic tradeoff generated by
the switching costs.
I simplify the problem to ensure that my estimation exercise is tractible while
maintaining a degree of flexibility in my specifications of utility and firm costs. In
particular, I allow firms to keep track of their market shares of healthy and unhealthy
individuals (as opposed to allowing firms to keep track of the full, joint distribution of
enrollee characteristics). Firms calculate their per-enrollee profits from a distribution
over consumer characteristics conditioned on their health status. This allows firms
11In essence, allowing this would require consumers to forecast future prices – meaning consumers
would have to keep track of who will purchase which plans – and their own future health statuses
over a potentially lengthy time-frame Handel (2013).
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to keep track of the dimension most correlated with cost while keeping a relatively
low-dimension state space. while firms face a recursive problem – which allows firms
to alter their markups based upon the switching costs faced by consumers – entry
and exit is assumed to be exogenous.12 While firms store summarized market infor-
mation – which allows firm behavior across markets to differ based on the degree of
competition – they do not keep track of the details of each of their competitors.
1.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and denoted by t; each period represents a year. The world is divided
into a number of discrete markets (representing individual U.S. counties) denoted by
m. Each market contains Nm consumers, with individual consumers denoted by i.
Each market also has a vector of observables Ym, including the benchmark subsidy
rate Bm.
In each period, for every market, there is an independent set of firms F tm, deter-
mined exogenously. Individual firms are denoted by f , and these firms offer plans in
a set Jf denoted by j, where the size of the set is determined exogenously. Each plan
j consists of a premium pj and a generosity index gj. Firms enter each period with
a market share of healthy people sfh and a market share of unhealthy people sfu. In
all markets, the outside good, good 0, is Medicare, and the set of all plans within a
market is denoted Jm.
13
12In my modification of the Oblivious Equilibrium concept (explained in detail below), firms keep
track of the competition they face in terms of the utility of competing plans. In some sense, firms
don’t care who those products are offered by (or how many competitors there are) – just the level
of competition in the market.
13There are two other substantial components of the post-65 insurnace system: Private plans
provided by employers as part of a retirement package or pension system, and Medigap, which
provides supplementary insurnace on top of traditional Medicare benefits. As individuals with
employer-provided plans have very low Medicare Advantage enrollment rates, I treat the employer-
based system as a separate entity and remove those individuals from the market. Since Medigap
plans are highly regulated and consistent across geographies, I abstract from the variance in those
plans and consider them part of the outside good.
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1.3.2 Timing
In each period t, actions are taken as follows:
1. Firms observe their information set I tf , described in detail below.
2. Firms simultaneously choose actions σf = {pj, gj}j.
3. Consumers choose plans from Jm.
4. Profits and the next state of the market are realized.
1.3.3 Consumers
Individual i has a vector of demographic characteristics Zi which includes age, gender,
health status, education, race, and current plan enrollment. Zi has distribution Cm.
Additionally, each individual is assigned to one of several income groups, represented
by the dummy variables dwi.
Consumer i considering plan j faces the following choice-specific utility function:
Uij =α0pj +
∑
w
αwpjdwi + SWk ∗ 1{switchij}+ βzZi + βggj
+ βzgZigj + ξj + ij (1.1)
In this equation, α = {α, αw} represents income-specific price sensitivity. βz cap-
tures tastes for the inside good that vary by demographic characteristics. βg captures
the mean taste for generosity and βzg captures demographic specific tastes for generos-
ity. SWk∗1{switchij} represents the cost SWr that consumer i must pay if j is offered
by a different firm than its current plan. SWk is allowed to vary across switch types:
switching between traditional Medicare and Medicare Advantage may incur a differ-
ent cost than switching between different Medicare Advantage providers. Finally, ξj
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represents the component of plan quality that is unobserved to the econometrician,
and ij represents the individual choice-specific unobservable, which is assumed to be
independently drawn according to a Type-I extreme value distribution.
Following Berry et al. (1995), I can decompose the utility obtained from good j
into a mean:
δj = α0pj + βggj + ξj
and an individual specific deviation:
µij =
∑
w
αwpjdwi + SW ∗ 1{switchij}+ βzgZigj + ij
Given a set of plans Jf , the probability that consumer i chooses plan j (often
known as the share function) can now be written as:
Pr(i chooses j) = sij =
exp(δj + µij)
1 +
∑
j′∈Jm exp(δj′ + µij′)
(1.2)
1.3.4 Firms
As mentioned previously, firms choose prices pj and generosity gj for some number
of plans J . The firm’s problem requires the firm to evaluate the expected profits of
different combinations of prices and generosities as a function of the information they
have about the market. I develop this problem in stages, starting with the firm’s
per-enrollee cost function. Computational restrictions prevent me from considering
a full-information model. I therefore adapt the Oblivious Equilibrium concept of
Weintraub et al. (2008, 2010) to this environment and define the information set
of firms based on what they need to calculate demand and cost and, thus, profits.
The translation is made more complicated by the inclusion of switching costs on the
demand side and therefore the need for firms to track their market shares.
With the information set established, I describe the market timing and write down
the firm’s problem as a recursive value function.
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Cost function
In order to evaluate the outcomes of various actions, the firm must first evaluate
the cost of providing insurance. The per-capita expected cost of providing plan j
to individual i is a function of the generosity index gj and is conditioned on the
demographic characteristics Zi and market characteristics Ym, such as the population
density, the doctor/population ratio, and the average per-capita income:
cijm(gj|Zi, Ym) = (γ+ γmYm) + γzZi + (γg + γgmYm)gj + γgzZigj + γg2g2 + ζf (1.3)
In this equation, γ represents the average marginal cost of providing Medicare-level
benefits and γm represents deviations due to market-specific factors. γz represents the
deviations in marginal cost due to consumer demographics (e.g. individuals in poor
health cost more to insure). Similarly, γg is the mean marginal cost of generosity
(with γgm capturing market-specific factors) and γgz captures the deviations from
that mean due to consumer demographics. I allow for the possibility of a quadratic
component to the cost of generosity.14 Finally, firms receive an i.i.d. cost shock ζf
each period.
Information set
The contents of the information set of firms is driven by the need (of the firms) to
calculate the expected profits for a given action and therefore the need to calculate de-
mand and costs. The demand for a particular plan j can be calculated by integrating
14Intuitively, if a more generous plan makes individual claims more attractive to the consumer, the
consumer will make additional claims, each of which may cost the firm more money. This quadratic
component provides additional curvature in the firm’s value function which is particularly helpful
during the estimation procedure.
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out the share function sij over consumers:
sj(pj, gj) =
∫
i
sij(pj, gj, Zi)dC(Zi)di
Since costs may be particularly correlated with health, firms can individually
calculate the fraction of healthy and unhealthy people who enroll in the plan:
sjh =
∫
i
sij(pj, gj, Zi)dC(Zi|h)di
sju =
∫
i
sij(pj, gj, Zi)dC(Zi|u)di
These plan-level shares can be aggregated into firm-level shares: sf =
∑
j sj; sfh =∑
j sjh; sfu =
∑
j sju. For simplicity, I drop sfu and consider only sfh – the same
calculations are made for sfu.
To compute the numerator of equation (1.2), the firm must know how its prod-
ucts map into the utility obtained by consumers δj + µij. Since consumers who are
currently enrolled in other MA firms or original Medicare face switching costs when
considering the firm’s products, the firm must know its own shares sfh and how many
consumers are enrolled in traditional Medicare versus other MA plans. To calculate
the denominator of equation (1.2), the firm must know something about the other
products available in the market.
The classic dynamic oliogoply approach would be to allow firms to observe the full
state space and action set of their competitors in the manner of Ericson and Pakes
(1995). Equilibrium would be defined as a set of policy functions that obtained the
supremum of the recursive value function. As Medicare Advantage markets often
have more than 10 incumbents, computational limitations prevent me from calculat-
ing optimal firm actions as a function of all of their competitors’ states and actions.15
15Even with recent improvements in solution techniques for Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria, such
as the stochastic algorithm introduced by Pakes and McGuire (2001), the number of unique states
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To reduce the computational burden, I adopt the Oblivious Equilibrium solution con-
cept developed by Weintraub et al. (2008, 2010). However, there are key differences
between their model and mine that I must address.
In the Weintraub et al. (2010) version of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) dynamic
oligopoly model, consumers are identical and the state space of firms is discrete, rep-
resenting (depending on interpretation) their level of capital or efficiency. Weintraub
et al. simplify the information set of their firms by defining a “long-run average state”
vector s¯, which is the expected number of firms (which may be fractional) with each
state n at any given period in equilibrium. The components of s¯ can be calculated
as:
s¯n = Et
[∑
f
1{f in state n}
]
Weintraub et al. write down their firm’s problem as a function of the firm’s own
state, and condition on this long-run average state. In their logit application, they
use this state to calculate the share sj the firm receives as a function of the price the
firm charges for its good. Recall that, for the generic logit model:
sj =
exp(δj)
1 +
∑
j′ exp(δj′)
Since firms in their model are symmetric, which implies that each firm with the
same state n will offer a good with the same δj = δ(n), they can rewrite their share
function using the components s¯n of s¯:
16
sj =
exp(δj)
1 +
∑
n s¯n exp(δ(n))
(1.4)
visited by the market is simply too large.
16For ease of exposition, in the following discussion I abstract away from the effect that firm j
has on the denominator of the share function. My implementation of the information set described
in this section involves a small modification to q¯i to remove the effect of one firm and an opposite
adjustment to sij to explicitly include the effect of product j.
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Unfortunately, consumers in my model are heterogenous, and have a utility com-
posed of δj + µij. However, a modification addresses the problem. Instead of taking
the expected state of firms, I take the expected impact (where the expectation is over
time) of the products they offer on the share equation for i:
q¯i = Et
[∑
j
exp(δj + µij)
]
(1.5)
In other words, given some belief about the future actions of competitors, the
firm constructs q¯i for each individual by summing their exponentiated utility terms
for each product in every period in the future and then taking the average over all
periods.17 In the traditional OE setup, these beliefs come from the optimal strategies
of firms in different states. In my estimation exercise, I form this expectation by
taking the observed actions of firms in my sample period. In my counterfactual, I
follow Weintraub et al. (2010) and solve for a self-consistent set of firm strategies and
beliefs.
As this expression is essentially the denominator of the traditional logit share
function, the share function used by the firm becomes:
sij =
exp(δj + µij)
1 + q¯i
(1.6)
In practice, I calculate integrals over the distribution of individuals by taking a
number of discrete draws from the conditional dC distributions. I form a vector Q¯
17This expression plays the same role in my model as equation (4.1) of (Weintraub et al., 2008,
p. 1386) does in the traditional OE setup.
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by calculating qi for each draw:
Q¯ = {q¯1, q¯2, · · · q¯n} (1.7)
The interpretation of q¯i is slightly different from s¯. q¯i is essentially the denominator
of the share function and in some sense measures how attractive of a product firm
j must offer (through δj) in order to achieve market share. As q¯i increases, the firm
must somehow increase δj in order to achieve the same share. Therefore, I call Q¯ the
expected competitive pressure of the market.18
Finally, as mentioned previously, the response of consumers to a product described
by pj and gj depends upon their current enrollment since they may be subject to a
switching cost if they choose plan j. The firm does not need to know where each
consumer is – merely whether or not they are enrolled in original Medicare, a com-
petitor’s MA plan, or in one of the firm’s own plans.19 The firm keeps track of it’s
own shares by health status sfh. Additionally, the firm knows the average share of
individuals enrolled in any MA plan s¯h = Et[
∑
f sfh]. With these numbers, the firm
can calculate the number of individuals enrolled in a different MA plan and the num-
ber of individuals enrolled in original Medicare. If e ∈ {0, 1, 2} represents enrollment
in original Medicare, a competitor’s plan, and one of firm’s own plans respectively,
18Calculating Q¯ in this way also addresses the fact that the state space in my model is continuous.
19Since there is no switching cost between plans within a firm, the demand will be the same across
individuals enrolled in all of a single firms’ plans and therefore firms only need to keep track of
shares at the firm level.
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the firm can calculate Se,h as:
20
S2,h = sfh;S1,h = s¯h − sfh;S0,h = 1− S1,h − S2,h
The firm can therefore calculate it’s share function with the modified sij of equa-
tion (1.6) as
sj =
∑
e,h
Se,h
∫
i
sijdC(Zi|e, h)di (1.8)
The firm knows Q¯, the conditional distributions of consumers dC(Zi|e, h), which
is invariant over time, and the average share of individuals enrolled in MA plans s¯h.
Each period, the firm observes an information set that includes:
If =
{
stfh, ζ
t
f
}
(1.9)
Profit function
The firm forms expected plan-level profits by integrating over the conditional dis-
tributions of consumers. Plan-level profits are a function of the plan characteristics
under consideration by the firm, and are conditioned on the information set of the
firm. Firms receive a risk-adjusted subsidy for each consumer based upon the market-
level benchmark and the consumer’s individual risk score ri, where ri = f(Zi) is a
20It is possible that sfh > s¯h, in which case S1,h will be negative. While this situation does not
occur in the data, I must solve a value function across the entire state space, and the continuation
values obtained for states in which this occurs will affect the value function in all other states. In the
results presented below, I bound S1,h from below by 0 and adjust S0,h accordingly. Other methods
of handling this situation, such as allowing negatives, do not substantially change the results.
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function of the consumer’s demographic characteristics:
pij(pj, gj|If ) = Nm
∑
e,h
Se,h
∫
i
(pj +Bri − cij) sij dC(Zi|e, h)di (1.10)
In other words, the firm calculates plan-level profits by considering six different
groups of individuals: healthy and unhealthy people who are enrolled in traditional
Medicare, a competitor’s plan, or one of the firm’s own plans. For each group of peo-
ple, the firm knows the distribution of their demographics, conditional on belonging
to that particular group, as well as the size of that group in the market. The firm uses
the Q¯ vector to calculate sij for each individual across the conditional distribution.
The firm also uses the the conditional distribution to calculate the cost incurred and
subsidy obtained by insuring a particular individual.
Firm’s problem
With these ingredients in hand, I can formulate a recursive value function for firms.
Their value is a function of their current share of consumers across health statuses
and is conditioned on their information set:
V (Ifm) = max
σf
∑
j
pij(pj, gj|Ifm) + βEI′
[
V
(
I ′fm(σf )
)]
(1.11)
In this recursive problem, β is the discount factor, which is constant across firms.
Dynamics are embedded in the evolution of Ifm. In particular, Ifm contains the firm’s
market shares and cost shock as well as the proportion of individuals enrolled in the
Medicare Advantage system.
1.4. Data 22
1.3.5 Equilibrium
I adopt the Oblivious Equilibrium notion of Weintraub et al. (2008) to this case. An
equilibrium in my model is an integral number of firms F , a firm strategy σ and
competitive pressure vector Q¯ such that:
1. Given Q¯, σ is the solution to equation (1.11).
2. When F firms play according to σ, Q¯ satisfies equation (1.7).
1.4 Data
MPTC construct a comprehensive dataset of the MA market to estimate a detailed
demand system. I employ this dataset with a few modifications to align with my
model of firm behavior. Broadly speaking, my data falls into three categories: plans,
consumers, and geographies. In this section, I briefly describe each of these categories
with a focus on the differences between the data used in this paper and the data used
in MPTC.
1.4.1 Sample selection
I restrict the temporal and geographic spread of my sample due to the needs of my
equilibrium notion and estimation procedure. I employ a variation of the Oblivious
Equilibrium concept of Weintraub et al. (2008) which imposes a notion of stationar-
ity.21 Additionally, my estimation procedure requires demographic-specific measures
of market share. To satisfy these requirements, I select 39 markets throughout the
United States where I observe a reasonable sample of individuals and do not observe
significant changes in the total number of firms and plans present in the period I
21In particular, I must assume that the data I observe is drawn from the ergodic set of market
states generated by the OE strategies.
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study. Additionally, I restrict my attention to plans offered starting January 1, 2008,
two years after the implementation of the current Medicare Advantage system.
1.4.2 Consumers
My data on individual consumers comes from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Sur-
vey (MCBS), an overlapping-panel survey of a nationally representative sample of
Medicare recipients sponsored by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) and produced by Westat. I use the Cost and Use files from the 2007-2010
data releases to obtain data on individual plan choices22 and demographic character-
istics including age, race, education, and income. I use a self-reported health status
variable to separate individuals into healthy and unhealthy categories.23
Summary statistics on the individuals used to produce my estimates are in Ta-
ble 1.1. Despite selecting on the 39 counties with the highest sample available, indi-
viduals in my subset are similar to the fuller sample of MPTC, if very slightly richer
(the average income in the full sample is $43,378 as opposed to $46,198 in my sample).
The second column reports the standard deviation of the yearly means for each of the
demographic characteristics I include. In particular, the demographic distribution
does not shift much between periods. Though the nationwide Medicare Advantage
enrollment rates increased significantly throughout the period, enrollment rates are
relatively stable in the counties I consider.
The Cost and Use files also contain information on Medicare payments to service
22The MCBS does not track the specific plan number chosen by the individual. Instead, it reports
the contract number and a number of variables (constructed from survey responses and administra-
tive records) related to the benefits offered by the plan. Following MPTC, I rank all of the plans
offered under the recorded contract by their closeness to the plan described by the survey participant
and assume the true choice is the closest match.
23The question asks responders to rate their own health as “excellent,” “very good,” “good”,
“fair,” or “poor.” I group the first three responses into “healthy” and the last two (as well as
any non-responses or refusals) into “unhealthy.” Nyman et al. (2007) use a similar question in the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to develop quality-of-life measures across the US population for
cost-utility analyses.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: individuals
Variable Mean Std. dev.
across years
Income $46,198 3391
Age 75.2 .171
Pct. healthy 56% 1.9
Pct. female 54.5% 0.96
Pct. black 6.1% 0.43
Pct. hispanic 1.5% 0.11
Pct. w/ bachelor’s degree 25.5% 0.93
Pct. enrolled in MA 26.0% 0.62
Obs. 9,346
Note: Observations are at the year-individual level. All calculations use MCBS
sample weights.
providers for individuals enrolled in traditional Medicare. This data is constructed
from a combination of patient interviews and administrative records.24 Table 1.2
summarizes Medicare expenses for different groups of individuals. I use this informa-
tion to construct the risk-adjusted subsidies CMS pays to firms for various individuals
across the demographic distribution.25
1.4.3 Plan data
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services maintains a public database of the
characteristics of all MA plans offered each year. This database includes detailed
information on plan costs, benefits, and options, at the contract-plan-segment level.
For each plan, I extract the price, coverage area, and a number of plan characteristics,
24For more on the construction of this file, see Eppig and Chulis (1997).
25The true risk adjustment formula uses ICD-9 diagnostic codes (in addition to other demographic
variables) to determine payments (CMS, 2014). Though the MCBS asks a number of questions about
diagnoses and illnesses, it does not contain ICD-9 codes and I therefore use self-reported health status
as a proxy.
1.4. Data 25
Table 1.2: Average Medicare payments across groups of individuals
Category Mean Std. dev.
All $6,743 16,177
Health status
Healthy 4,390 10,761
Unhealthy 11,452 21,816
Gender
Male 8,199 18,877
Female 7,117 15,406
Age
65-69 4,366 14,008
70-74 6,395 18,742
75-79 8,031 15,132
80-84 8,976 15,561
85+ 10,731 20,431
Obs. 6,792
Note: Observations are at the year-individual level. All calculations use MCBS
sample weights.
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including copays for doctor and hospital visits, as well as flags for drug coverage,
dental coverage, and vision coverage.
MPTC estimate the relative preferences of individuals for these different plan
features. I use their estimates to transform the multi-dimension plan characteristics
into a single generosity index gj, for each plan j.
26 Since MA plan providers are
required to offer coverage for each service that Medicare covers, I define gj = 0 to be
Medicare-level coverage and linearly transform the generosity index to ensure non-
negativity. Examples of plans with different generosities can be found in Table 1.4.
Table 1.3 contains summary information on plans. Notably, 81% of firms offer
more than 1 plan, and 73% of those have at least one plan with zero annual premium.
Indeed, 43% of all plans offered across markets do not charge a premium. I use these
facts to simplify the firm’s problem in my estimation routine: I fix the number of
plans per firm at 2 and restrict the first plan’s premium to zero. For firms with more
than two plans, I weight the attributes of the plan by the plan’s individual share.
Figure Figure 1.1 shows the results of this weighted average for plans with positive
prices.
Table 1.5 shows the average number of firms and plans for each of the years I
consider. While there is some variance in firms from year to year, the yearly means
do not differ substantially from the overall mean of about 15 firms. There is a drop
in plans between 2009 (21.8 plans on average) and 2010 (16.8 plans). The biggest
single change was in Franklin County, Ohio, (in which Columbus, Ohio is located)
which went from 28 plans in 2009 to 17 plans in 2010.
26This essentially assumes that, near the selections offered, consumers and firms view different
plan attributes as perfect substitutes.
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Figure 1.1: Firm shares and actions
Note: Price measured in thousands of dollars per year. Each dot represents one
firm-year. Price and generosity weighted by previous period plan-level shares. Zero
price plans excluded.
1.4. Data 28
Table 1.3: Summary statistics: Plans
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Pct. w/ 0 premium 43%
Annual Premium (if > 0) $825 629
Generosity 1.736 .809
Med. plans per firm 2
Avg. plans per firm 2.85 1.4
Pct. firms with > 1 plan 81%
Pct. of those with 0 prem plan 73%
Obs. 2306
Table 1.4: Example plan generosities
Variable Generosity ≈ 1 Generosity ≈ 2
Drug coverage Yes Yes
Vision coverage No Yes
Dental coverage No No
Primary care copay $15 $10
Specialist copay $30 $25
Out-of-pocket limit $4,000 $2,500
Generosity index .998 2.03
Table 1.5: Competition across years
Year Firms Plans
2008 15.6 (4.69) 20.3 (6.06)
2009 17.1 (5.23) 21.8 (6.14)
2010 13.4 (4.85) 16.8 (6.00)
Note: Figures averaged across 39 counties. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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1.4.4 Geographies
I obtain data on individual markets (which are defined as counties) from the Area
Health Resources Files maintained by the Health Resources and Services Adminis-
tration within the US Department of Health and Human Services. The files combine
and summarize data from multiple sources, including the Census Bureau and other
Health and Human Services sources, into a single county-level dataset.
For each county, I extract the population, the median income, the number of
practicing medical doctors, the number of hospitals, and the number of nursing homes
to use as cost covariates. I additionally extract the “contiguous county” file which
allows me to identify neighboring counties for construction of instruments. Finally,
I extract the “benchmark” per-capita subisdy rate for MA plans. The benchmark
rate is the subsidy paid to a firm for a person of average risk and varies by market
according to Medicare’s average costs. I use this market-specific benchmark rate
along with the the average Medicare expenditures for individuals in different groups
to construct individual-specific subsidy rates.
Table 1.6 summarizes my geographic data. Since I form market shares from the
MCBS data, I restrict my analysis to those markets with the greatest MCBS sample
size. This in turn means the county markets I consider are significantly larger than
the average across the United States.
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics: Markets
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Num. MA firms 15.21 3.633
Total population 1,435 1,835
Medicare population 180.3 207.9
Per-capita income $40,825 8,330
Num. doctors 3,782 4,831
Num. hospitals 19.1 22.6
Num. nursing facilities 47.9 63.4
Benchmark rate $10,267 865
Obs. 39
Note: Markets are defined as counties. Population measured in thousands of people.
Per-capita income and benchmark rate are annual figures.
1.5 Empirical implementation
I use a multistep approach to estimate the model parameters for the demand and
supply sides θ = {θD, θS}, and calculate counterfactuals using a modification of the
Weintraub et al. (2010) algorithm. For computational simplicity, I limit each firm to
offering two plans. Since 40% of plans observed in the market have no premium, I
restrict one of the firm’s plans to be a zero premium plan. The firm’s action therefore
consists of three components: σf = {g0, p1, g1}.
1.5.1 Estimation
Preliminaries
Since the policy function generated by the model is dependent on the starting shares
of the firm, I must construct these shares for each firm-year observation. I use the
MCBS observations to form these shares for 39 markets.27 For each firm present in
27The MCBS has relatively low sample size in most of the counties it observes. Gandhi et al.
(2013) show that errors in market shares caused by small sample size can bias demand estimates.
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the data, I form share-weighted averages of price and generosity to match the three
components of the firm’s action in my model and adjust the decision of consumers
accordingly.
Demand
I estimate the demand model following the two-stage approach of MPTC, which builds
on the discrete choice estimation approach of Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) by
adding panel data on consumers’ choices. I start by re-writing the utility model as a
combination of individual specific terms and product fixed effects δj:
Uij =
∑
r
αrPjdri + F ∗ 1{switchij}+ βzZi + βzgZigj + δj + ij
For a given guess of individual specific demand parameters θDZ = {αr, F, βz, βzg}, I
use the Berry (1994) contraction to find the unique set of δj(θ
D
Z ) that match predicted
shares to observed market shares.28 Using the individual choice data from the MCBS,
and its panel structure to calculate switches, I construct the likelihood function for
an individual as follows, where Ci represents the choice of individual i:
li(j; θ
D
Z ) = s
Ci=j
ij
In the first step of the demand estimation, I maximize the likelihood function over
the space of θDZ .
29 At the point estimate, θˆDZ , I store the unique δˆj. In the second step
of the demand estimation, I regress these δˆj on on observable product characteristic
MPTC avoid this issue by using monthly enrollment data from CMS. However, this data is only
available at the aggregate level. As I must separate out shares by health status, I must read shares
from the MCBS directly and therefore must limit myself to markets in which there is sufficient
sample.
28As the choice set is the same for all individuals in the market, I need only construct market-level
shares, as opposed to demographic-specific market shares. I therefore use CMS Enrollment files,
which cover the entire population of a county, to construct these shares, thus avoiding measurement
error problems within the Berry (1994) contraction.
29This step utilitizes the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) maximization routine.
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according to the terms in the original demand equation, where ξj represents product-
specific unobservables:
δj = α0Pj + β + βggj + ξj
I instrument for price using the average benchmark in the surrounding counties
as well as the average generosities of competitors in the same market per Berry et al.
(1995).
Supply
With demand estimates in hand, I construct the information set If for each firm. This
consists of calculating the average competitive pressure observed in each market for
each draw from that market’s demographic distribution. As I take the number of firms
in each period as exogenous, I create distinct measures of competitive pressure for
each firm-year observed in the data and then average across firm-year observations.30
Conditional moment restrictions
Using notation from Pakes et al. (2006), my model creates an approximation R(·) to
the true profit function of firms pi(·) in the following sense:
∂pifj
∂Xfj
=
∂Rfj
∂Xfj
+ ν1fj
In this expression, Xfj represents all of the data I observe about firm f and
plan j, including market-level characteristics and the demographic distributions. ν1fj
30Instead of the approach described in this paragraph and the following algorithm, I could follow
the approach of Weintraub et al. (2010) and solve for a self-consistent policy function and expected
competitive environment, as I do for my counterfactual simulations. Unforunately, their algorithm is
not guaranteed to converge and requires significant additional computational complexity. in practice,
the application of their approach increases the computational effort by an order of magnitude. The
difference in policy functions computed by the two approaches at the point estimates described in
the subsequent section is approximately 10%.
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represents both expectational and measurement errors at the firm-plan level. Expec-
tational errors can come from a number of sources, including incomplete information
on the environment or asymmetric information on the states of other firms. As pi·
is the result of maximizing the profit function, any error in the profit function will
contribute to the error in the policy function as well.
I impose a conditional moment restriction:
E[ν1f (θ0)|If ] = 0 ∀f
This restriction states that, conditional on their information sets, firms choose
their actions optimally on average – this is equivalent to a restriction on firm behavior:
E[σDATA − σMODEL|If ] = 0
Since I am imposing a conditional moment restriction, there are an infinite number
of possible instruments – indeed any function of any component of the information set
If is a valid instrument. Chamberlain (1987) shows the efficient set of instruments are
formed by the derivative of the moment restriction with resepect to each parameter
when the derivative is evaluated at θ0:
Hf = E
[
∂ν1f (θ0)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣ If]
Following Berry et al. (1999), I approximate the optimal instruments by calcu-
lating these derivatives at an initial guess of the parameters and recalculating them
when I update the weight matrix during the GMM procedure.
Two-step GMM
I use a a two-step GMM approach. I start by setting my weight matrix to the identity
W1 = I and calculate an approximation to the optimal instruments based upon an
initial guess. I minimize the GMM objective function f(θS) = g′W1g to obtain an
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initial estimate of the parameters θˆS1 .
31 I update the weight matrix according to
the sample variance-covariance matrix W−12 = Sˆ(θˆ
S
1 ) =
1
n
∑
n gg
′. I also update the
approximation to the optimal instruments.
I then minimize the modified GMM objective function f(θS) = g′W2g to obtain
my final parameter estimates θˆ.
Identifcation
I assume that, in expectation, firms choose actions optimally given their information
on the markets and the incentives they face from the terms of their value function.
Parameters are therefore identified through their impact on the value function of
firms and its derivative. The vector of first order conditions for optimality of the
firm’s value function can be written as follows:
0 =
∑
j
∂pij
∂σf
+ βE
[
∂V
∂σf
]
This set of first order conditions illustrates the primary incentives faced by firms.
Note that σf is a vector consisting of the features of all of f ’s plans. An expansion
of
∂pij
∂σf
would explicitly reveal a cross-product cannibalization issue for firms through
the mechanism of sij: the number of people you attract to an individual plan is a
function of the features of all the plans you offer. Since firms must offer plans at the
same price and features to every consumer in the market, these inter-plan derivatives
are crucial in determining the degree to which firms can price discriminate between
consumers with different preferences.
The second term of these first order conditions captures the intertemporal tradeoff
31As analytic derivatives are unavailable and individual function evaluations are extremely expen-
sive (see the computation subsection for more), I use the Nelder-Mead simplex search method.
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between today’s profits and tomorrow’s share – and the effect of tomorrow’s share
on tomorrow’s profits. This term is the key difference between this model and previ-
ous efforts to model the Medicare Advantage market. Its value at various points in
strategy and state space determines whether firms are engaging in “collecting” mar-
ket share or “harvesting” that share (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007, Section 2.6.2). Its
scale relative to the first term determines the degree to which that behavior dominates
the selection and product cannibalization concerns of the firm.
My estimator identifies the different components of the cost function through
intra- and inter-market variance along with the demand distribution. The model
generates a policy function for all points in the firm’s state space. Differences in
observed behavior of firms at different points in that space within the same market
identify the constant and health-specific terms in the cost function. Differences in
observed behavior of firms at similar points in markets with different attributes iden-
tify market-level cost parameters. The other demographic-specific terms in the cost
function are identified by cross-market variation in the distribution of demographic
characteristics.
1.5.2 Counterfactual
In order to evaluate the effects of alternative policies, I must solve for the equilibrium
strategies of firms. My estimation approach uses the data to calculate the expected
competitive environment faced by firms in each market. In a counterfactual scenario,
however, the expected competitive environment is likely to be different from what I
observe in the data. For any given strategy σ, I can calculate the expected information
set C(σ) = E[If |σ], and for any given information set C, I can calculate the optimal
strategy σ(C). The challenge is to find a fixed point of these simultaneous equations.32
32In a full-information version of the model, multiple equilibria are possible. Given the restrictions
I have placed on firms’ information sets, it seems likely (though not inevitable) that the number of
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I proceed by fixing the number of firms to the average number of firms observed in
the market33 and adapting the algorithm of Weintraub et al. (2010). The algorithm
may be outlined as follows:34
1. Start by initializing σ0 = 0∀sh,f , ζf , t = 0, and x = 1.
2. Loop until x < tol:
(a) Given σt, calculate the expected information set Ct by forward simulation.
(b) Given Ct, solve the single firm problem maxσf
∑
j pij(·) + βVt(s′(σf )) to
obtain σt+1
(c) Set x = ||σt − σt+1|| and t = t+ 1
(d) Set σt+1 = λσt+1 + (1− λ)σt
1.5.3 Computation
The primary computational challenge is calculating σMODEL(sh,f |θS, Ifm) for a given
set of supply-side parameters. The primary advantage of the Oblivious Equilibrium
approach is the result that I must merely solve a single firm problem for each market.
To do this, I discretize the sh,f , ζf information set space and use a value function
iteration algorithm:
1. Start by initializing V0 = 0∀sh,f , ζf , t = 0, and x = 1.
possible equilibrium are fewer than in a more complete information environment. In practice, I use
a variety of different starting points for each counterfactual and find only a single equilibrium.
33Weintraub et al. (2010) include entry and exit, whereas I treat it as exogenous. While my algo-
rithm is easily modified to include entry and exit, doing so would require assumptions about entry-
and exit-relevant parameters. Therefore, for consistency with my estimation exercise, I abstract
from entry and exit in the results I present below.
34As in Weintraub et al.’s case, this algorithm is not guaranteed to converge. Indeed, the algorithm
often oscillates around the fixed point without progressing toward it. My implementation detects
this condition and employs a local restart strategy with a reduction in the update parameter λ to
encourage convergence. In practice, this has worked well.
1.5. Empirical implementation 37
2. Loop until x < tol:
(a) Loop over each state sh,f , ζf :
i. Solve the single firm problem maxσf
∑
j pij(·) + βVt(s′(σf )) to obtain
Vt+1(sh,f , ζf ).
(b) Set x = ||Vt − Vt+1|| and t = t+ 1
To calculate the profit of various actions pij, I numerically integrate out over the
MCBS sample using their sample weights (forming dC(Zi)).
35 To ensure the single
firm problem is continuously differentiable, I use bicubic spline interpolation over the
value function grid Vt to estimate the firm’s continuation value for any future state
s′h,f . Once the value function converges, I construct sample moments from observed
firm behavior by optimizing the strategy at each state observed in the data using the
interpolated continuation values.
The estimation procedure spends most of its time in the profit function and
its derivative calculating numeric integrals over demographic distributions. The
Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno extrema-finding algorithm used in step 2(a)i can
require over 1000 executions of the profit function and 500 executions of the deriva-
tive to solve the single firm problem from an arbitrary starting point to the required
precision. A complete execution of the value function iteration to the required pre-
cision over 1,200 grid points requires roughly 1,000,000 total executions of the profit
and derivative functions. These calculations must be repeated for each market, for
each guess of the cost parameters. To make matters worse, these functions must be
calculated to full 64-bit floating point accuracy to ensure numerical stability of the
outer-most GMM minimization routine. To enhance precision, I perform all numer-
ical integration and moment calculations using the summation algorithm provided
35It is possible to construct a distribution of preferences such that the firm’s problem in step 2(a)i
admits multiple solutions. I perform a number of checks to ensure that the distribution created by
the MCBS draws and my demand estimates leads to unique solutions of the firm’s problem.
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by Kahan (1965). To achieve sufficient speed, the model is implemented in C++,
uses OpenMP technology to parallelize the optimization of individual states within
the value function grid and uses Intel MPI technology to coordinate the simultane-
ous solution of the value functions for different markets across multiple nodes in a
high-performance computing cluster.36
1.6 Results
Tables Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 contain parameter estimates for the demand side. In
general, these estimates are in line with other studies of the demand for Medicare
Advantage – particularly those from MPTC. The estimates imply that seniors face
a cost of roughly $1,300 when switching from Medicare to Medicare Advantage and
$1,040 when switching between firms within the Medicare Advantage system. When
compared to the average annual premium of $825, the switching costs have a large
impact on the behavior of consumers. However, even when switching costs are incor-
porated, Medicare Advantage plans are relatively undesirably: the constant disutility
of Medicare Advantage is equivalent to $1,262. On average, a unit of generosity is
worth $284 to consumers.
Table 1.9 summarizes the taste distribution implied by these estimates. On av-
erage, unhealthy people have a lower preference for MA plans – −3.755 for healthy
people versus −3.858 for unhealthy people – but have a greater taste for generosity
– .745 for healthy people versus .863 for unhealthy people. This result is in line with
common models of heterogenous risk and adverse selection: the greater your risk, the
greater your demand for insurance against that risk.37
36My code is available upon request.
37Lustig (2011) estimates the demand and supply sides simultaneously. This allows for increased
flexibility on the demand side with respect to individual product features while still using a generosity
index on the supply side – in essence forcing the average taste for generosity to be equal to 1. Data
use restrictions prevented the implementation of this approach.
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Table 1.7: Estimates: First stage demand parameters
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Income-level price effects (per $1000)
Price for medium income group 0.0069 0.072
Price for high income group 0.048 0.070
Switching costs
Medicare-to-Medicare Advantage -3.971 .056
Inter-contract Medicare Advantage -3.18 .098
Demographic level effects
Age .0049 .012
Female .0035 .166
Black -.107 .4289
Hispanic -1.857 2.255
Graduated high school -.373 .269
Some college -.554 .289
Bachelor’s degree -.372 .298
Healthy .132 .187
Demographic-generosity interactions
Age -.001 .005
Female -.012 .073
Black .063 .182
Hispanic .718 .915
Graduated high school .118 .118
Some college .129 .126
Bachelor’s degree -.122 .131
Healthy -.010 .081
Weighted log likelihood -11,241
Sample size 12,806
Note: All dollar amounts are in thousands per year.
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Table 1.8: Estimates: Second stage demand parameters
Variable IV
Premium -3.05 (.184)
Generosity 0.865 (.105)
Constant -3.85 (1.03)
Sample size 22,717
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All dollar amounts are in thousands per
year.
Table 1.9: Implied taste distribution by health status
Variable Mean utils Std. dev.
Healthy
α -3.04 .020
Taste for MA plans (βi) -3.755 .249
Taste for generosity (βig) .745 .130
Unhealthy
α -3.03 .021
Taste for MA plans (βi) -3.858 .309
Taste for generosity (βig) .863 .138
Obs. 4122
Note: Observations are at the year-individual level. All calculations use MCBS
sample weights. α is per $1,000.
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Table 1.10: Estimates: Cost parameters
Variable Mean Std. err.
Base cost
Constant 4.416 0.095
Market population 0.0589 0.0238
Unhealthy 9.142 0.116
Age 0.0850 0.0100
Female 0.0272 0.0591
Generosity cost
Constant .0494 .0093
Market population 0.003 0.032
Unhealthy .0309 .0269
Age .0095 .0065
Female -0.0118 .0245
Generosity quadratic cost
Constant 0.0450 .0240
Unhealthy 0.0004 0.0392
Obs. 1,779
Note: Observations are at the year-firm level. Costs are measured in thousands of
dollars per enrollee per year.
Table 1.10 contain parameter estimates for the firm’s cost function. These esti-
mates imply the average base cost of insuring a healthy person is $5,293; compared
to an average subsidy of $5,783, firms earn a 9.3% margin. The base cost of insuring
an unhealthy person is $14,609; compared to a benchmark of $16,298, firms earn a
slightly higher margin of 11.6%. The average Medicare payments for healthy and
unhealthy people are $4,390 and $11,452, respectively. These estimates imply that
firms spend an average of $184 on benefits beyond those of Medicare as measured by
the generosity index.
In Table 1.11, I compare these results to those obtained using a static model.
Ignoring switching costs completely results in much lower cost estimates, shown in
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Table 1.11: Estimation summary
Specification (I) (II) (III)
Switching costs No Yes Yes
Supply model Static Static Dynamic
Demand
Medicare-to-MA cost N/A 1,302 1,302
Mean elasticity .131 1.56 1.56
Mean inclusive value $223 252 252
Supply
Base cost $3,450 5,509 4,416
Additional cost of unhealthy enrollees $8,808 9,071 9,142
Cost per year of enrollee’s age above 65 -$80 -23 85
Mean generosity expenditure $432 213 184
Note: All dollar amounts annualized. Base cost is for a 65-year-old male in good
health enrolled in a plan with 0 generosity. Inferred values (elasticity, inclusive
value, generosity expenditures) calculated using observed plan characteristics and
MCBS sample weights.
column I. This change is driven by the low overall enrollment rate: roughly two-thirds
of seniors in my sample never enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan. The demand
estimator must rationalize this behavior and does so in part by significantly lowering
the price elasticity.38 This in turn implies that firm margins are considerably higher
and therefore costs are much lower. Though consumers are much less price sensitive,
the estimated value of Medicare advantage is roughly the same as the specification
with switching costs. Column II of Table 1.11 illustrates the results of incorporating
switching costs on the consumer side but assuming firms are myopic on the firm side.
This specification results in significantly higher costs for some enrollees. Both of these
alternative specifications infer a negative marginal cost of aging.
The results of these alternative specifications are driven by the differences in the
38In some sense, the inclusion of the panel data allows the estimator to push some of the observed
distaste for MA plans into a switching cost. The switching cost itself is then identified through the
implied utility that would have been obtained if the consumer had switched.
1.6. Results 43
policy functions. Figure Figure 1.2 illustrates a “slice” of the three components of the
policy function for a firm in Brown County, Wisconsin, using the preferred estimates
of demand and cost under both models of firm behavior. When switching costs are
ignored, firms behave uniformly across their possible market shares. Per Farrell and
Klemperer (2007), when switching costs are included, myopic firms set higher prices
and lower generosities than firms who take into account the future value of market
share.
Taken together, these results reveal that MA firms do not face lower costs than
the federal government. These increased costs may reflect increased administrative
costs relative to Medicare, or difficulties negotiating favorable contracts with service
providers.
The results of a counterfactual simulation for Brown County, Wisconsin in which
the switching costs are lowered by 50% are in column 2 of Table 1.12. The reduced
switching cost results in fewer consumers enrolled in Medicare Advantage overall –
11.6% in the counterfactual compared to 23.7% in the baseline scenario. The increase
in consumer “liquidity” causes firms with low shares to reduce their generosities – they
don’t have to offer as generous of a plan to obtain the same share. In equilibrium,
firm with larger shares respond by lowering their generosities as well, as they don’t
have to compete with as generous plans. This results in an overall reduction of the
quality of plans offered in the market, causing many consumers to leave. Those that
remain are slightly less healthy than enrollees in the baseline scenario. The difference
in margins combined with lowered generosities leads to roughly a 10% increase in per-
enrollee firm profits – though the total profits are much smaller, as fewer individuals
are participating in Medicare Advantage.
Total welfare, including consumer surplus from the MA program, firm profits, and
government spending on traditional Medicare benefits and MA subsidies, increases
from negative $224.64 million to negative $205.82 million. This is largely driven by
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Figure 1.2: Policy function comparison
Note: Policy function shown for a firm in Brown County, Wisconsin. Policy
functions calculated using preferred estimates for demand and cost. Market share is
of both healthy and unhealthy individuals.
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changes in government spending: in the baseline scenario, the government spends
$79 million on MA subisides and $158 million on FFS benefits.39 With the reduction
in switching costs, and accompanying reduction in MA enrollment, the government
spends $40 million on subsidies and $176 on FFS benefits, a total savings of $21
million.
Column 3 of Table 1.12 reports the results of a second counterfactual scenario in
which subsidies are cut by 5%. This change leads to firms no longer offering the zero-
premium plan and significantly increasing the premium for their second plan: the
positive premium plan in the baseline scenario is offered for $302 and the counterfac-
tual plan is offered for $772. Generosity is also reduced – the welfare from generosity
for the second plan in the baseline is $397 and drops to $311 in the counterfactual
plan. These effects combine to allow firms to maintain a degree of profitibility on
a per-enrollee basis, but they have a drastic impact on enrollment: only 5.8% of
consumers stay in Medicare Advantage.
Aggregating up to the market level, the change results in an improvement in total
welfare of $23.06 million. As in the lower switching cost scenario, the change is driven
by government spending and is partly offset by a reduction in total firm profits and
consumer welfare.
39These baseline numbers are computed using model-predicted outcomes. For comparison,
CMS reported $163 million in Medicare FFS spending for Brown County in 2009, the middle of
my sample period. (Source: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Dashboard/Geo-Var-County/GeoVar_County.html)
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Table 1.12: Counterfactual: 50% decrease in switching costs
Baseline Lower switching costs Lower subsidies
MA enrollment
Healthy 24.3% 11.6% 5.7%
Unhealthy 23.2% 11.7% 5.9%
Per-enrollee:
Welfare from generosity $328 278 311
Average subsidy $10,162 10,568 9,728
Mean firm costs $9,951 10,249 10,005
Mean firm profits $542 606 495
Total: (in millions)
Consumer welfare $8.30 7.97 3.49
Firm profits $4.23 2.31 0.95
Subsidies to MA firms $79.29 40.36 18.65
Medicare FFS spending $157.87 175.73 187.37
Total welfare (millions) $(224.64) (205.82) (201.58)
Note: Figures for Brown County, Wisconsin. Welfare, subsidies, and profits
calculated using model-predicted enrollment and MCBS sample weights. Total
consumer welfare is calculated using the inclusive value metric across all Medicare
recipients and does not include base welfare generated by Medicare FFS benefits.
“Lower subsidies” counterfactual calculated with firms only offering a single plan
each with unrestricted premium.
For comparison, CMS reported 2010 Medicare FFS spending of $163 million for the
county.
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1.7 Conclusion
The cost of Medicare, both as a percentage of the federal budget and as a percentage
of GDP, has risen steadily since its introduction despite the presence of many ‘gaps’
in coverage relative to the insurance plans sponsored by employers. Seeking in part to
eliminate these gaps cost-effectively, policy makers have implemented the Medicare
Advantage system, which offers subsidies to private firms who offer plans to con-
sumers. For historical reasons, the subsidies are currently set well above Medicare’s
cost – in other words a senior who switches from Medicare to Medicare Advantage
increases their burden on taxpayers. However, almost all firms provide supplemental
benefits on top of the mandated set of Medicare-equivalent services, meaning that a
direct comparison is difficult.
To understand the welfare impact of the Medicare Advantage program, I estimate
the cost structure of insurers using a revealed-preference approach. In contrast to
previous work on the subject, I introduce a dynamic model of the Medicare Advantage
market. The dynamic incentives in my model are driven by the existence of switching
costs on the consumer side. Firms know that if they lower their prices today, they
can attract a greater share to harvest tomorrow.
I find that the costs of private firms are higher than Medicare’s by a significant
margin. My estimates also suggest that the risk adjustment formula used by Medi-
care overcompensates firms for unhealthy enrollees, relative to healthy enrollees. My
results highlight the importance of switching costs in this environment – alternative
estimation approaches that ignore these costs produce significantly different results.
In a counterfactual simulation, I find a reduction in the switching cost leads to
a reduction in the number of Medicare Advantage enrollees. Those that remain are
slightly sicker than in the baseline scenario, and firms make greater per-enrollee prof-
its. These changes are driven by the increased “fluidity” of demand: low-share firms
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don’t need to offer particularly generous plans in order to attract share, and high-
share firms reduce their generosities as well to save costs. In equilibrium, the average
level of generosity offered in the market decreases which pushes many consumers out
of the system. Since the subsidies are higher than Medicare’s costs, the change leads
to an increase in total surplus of $18.9 million per year for a mid-sized county.
My second counterfactual simulation shows that reducing the subsidies offered to
firms would also have a substantial positive effect on total welfare. However, this net
effect is driven by changes in government spending and comes with a significant loss
in welfare for individuals.
There are a number of avenues for future work. While the median number of plans
offered by each firm is 2, many firms offer additional plans. Endogenizing the precise
number of plans could lead to insights about the administrative costs of marginal
plans. Endogenizing entry and exit could provide information about the overall fixed
costs of the program.
These results support a view of Medicare as a relatively tax-efficient way to pro-
vide medical services to seniors in the United States. While private firms may offer
attractive supplemental benefit packages, these currently come at a high cost to tax-
payers.
Chapter 2
Does Premerger Notification
Matter? Evidence from Cable
Television
2.1 Introduction
In 1976 Congress passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act as a response to several
criticisms of anti-trust policy. While the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 had given
broad powers to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), these powers were largely reactive.1 Enforcement agencies had difficulties
challenging anticompetitive actions after they had occured and often found restoring
a market to competitive status a costly endeavor. The HSR Act sought to address
these concerns by forcing individuals and firms to report certain asset transfers or
purchases and obtain pre-clearance before completing the transaction.ftc (2009)
Though the FTC and DOJ have reported the number of disclosures they’ve re-
ceived on an annual basis (though individual filings are generally private) and used
the powers granted under the HSR Act to challenge several large proposed mergers,
it has been difficult to cleanly test the effectiveness of the policy. In many markets
where large mergers are observed, it is difficult to obtain data on the holdings of the
1This chapter includes a substantial contribution from Kailin Clarke.
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parties. It is also difficult to estimate the consumer level impacts of cross-industry
mergers, and thus to get a sense of the degree of regulatory scrutiny transactions face.
Additionally, in order to test the effectiveness of the policy we need to have a sense
of the mergers that did not happen – not just those that did.
The cable television industry provides a solution to both those concerns. Firms
providing cable television service must register their ‘cable communities’ with the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), which makes these registrations, as well as
ownership changes, public. We combine this data with data from the Census Bureau
to obtain a complete picture of the cable industry in the United States from 2000
to 2012. Not only does this data allow us to identify actual acquisitions, we can
also construct the universe of potential acquisitions to identify model paramenters.
Additionally, this data allows us to understand the degree of horizontal competition -
referred to in the industry as ‘overbuild’ - these firms face in their individual commu-
nities. We assume any merger which includes overbuilt communities - in other words,
any merger that results in a local market shift from duopoly to monopoly - would
face increased scrutiny from regulators.
To test the effect of HSR, we develop a model of firm valuation which includes
terms representing the cost of regulator scrutiny, particularly for acquisitions which
contain a horizontal component. We then take this model to the actual and potential
acquisition sets for the top four firms in the market: Comcast, Time Warner, Charter,
and Cox. We concentrate on the top firms largely to reduce the assumptions we must
make about their choice sets. First, given their size and the (general) strength of
their balance sheets, it is reasonable to believe their marginal decision to acquire a
particular small regional competitor is not based on financial constraints. This allows
us to consider each decision independently, instead of considering a bundle of multiple
acquisitions. Second, given their geographic spread, it is reasonable to believe they
consider acquisitions across the entire extent of the United States. This allows us to
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remain agnostic about which small firms entire the decision set of the large firms.
Our results indicate the HSR filing requirement has the desired effect: firms pursue
fewer mergers involving a horizontal component than the other characteristics of such
mergers would indicate. Our results are robust to several variations of our empirical
specification.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we provide brief
background on both the cable industry and merger policy. Section 3 introduces a
valuation model for potential acquisitions which leads to our simple test. In Section
4 we describe our novel dataset constructed from FCC, Census, and FTC data, high-
lighting the difficulty posed by limited information on former cable providers. Details
on our data cleaning methods are left for an appendix. In Section 5 we detail our
empirical strategy and provide the results of our test. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-Trust Improvements Act
The primary effect of HSR was the creation of the FTC and DOJ’s Merger Prenotifi-
cation Program. Under the program, parties considering a sizeable transaction must
file a “Notification and Report Form” and pay a substantial fee based upon the size
of the proposed transaction. The parties must wait 30 days during which regulatory
agencies may request additional information or time to review the transaction. If the
reviewing agencies believe a proposed transaction violates antitrust laws, they may
attempt to prohibit completion of the transaction by filing for an injunction in federal
district court. Information provided to regulators during this process, including the
original filing, is not subject to public disclosure, though court filings are generally
available.
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If the parties are conducting routine transactions or have experience with the
system, they may file a request for Early Termination of the waiting period. If the
Early Termination is approved, the transaction is made public as part of the Federal
Register. While this data can be used to give a flavor of the types of transactions
generally seen by regulators as unlikely to have anticompetitive effects, it cannot be
used to identify the entire universe of attempted or successful purchases, since not
all transacting parties request Early Terminations and not all Early Terminations
requests are approved.
Transaction reports are necessary when either the value of the assets or the size
of the parties reaches certain thresholds. These rules are designed to take effect
cumulatively, so a firm which slowly acquires the assets of a competitor through
multiple transactions will be forced to report even if each individual transaction is
small. Thresholds are adjusted periodically by the FTC and DOJ to reflect inflation.
Figure Figure 2.1 illustrates the various reporting thresholds based on the size of the
parties and transaction denominated in dollars. As of 2013, reporting is required if
the acquiring party will hold assets of $281 million or more, or if one party is worth at
least $14.2 million, the other is worth at least $142 million, and the assets transferred
are worth at least $71 million.fed (2013) An additional set of reporting requirements
exist based on the percentage of assets transferred: filing is required if the transaction
involves $71 million in assets consisting of at least 50% of a company.
2.2.2 History of cable
Cable television began in the early 1950s as a way to improve the reception of over-the-
air broadcast channels in remote communities. High demand for broadcast television
coupled with the Federal Communications Commission’s 1948 “freeze” on licenses to
construct new stations led to the creation of Community Antenna Television (CATV)
systems.of Broadcast Communications (2013) Instead of a separate antenna required
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Figure 2.1: Flowchart of the 2013 Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting thresholds
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for each household who wanted to receive broadcasts, a single, more sensitive antenna
could be placed in a centralized location and connected to households through wiring.
Demand for cable systems spread rapidly, and by the 1970s even large metropolitan
areas were wired for cable. Local governments executed ad-hoc franchise agreements
with cable operators; in exchange for the (sometimes exclusive) right to provide cable
services to the area, cable operators would guarantee certain benefits such as edu-
cational and governmental channels or special rates for particular segments of the
population.Commission (2012)
Exclusive channels began appearing on cable systems starting with Home Box
Office in 1972 and quickly became a large draw for subscribers. With the increased
bandwidth available through wired technology, cable operators were able to offer a
much wider variety to consumers than the broadcast alternative.Association (2013b);
Commission (2012); Eisenmann (2000)
Today, over 90% of households have access to cable television and over 60% of
households are active subscribers.Association (2013a); Nielsen (2011) Cable operators,
empowered by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 discussed below, have also used
the two-way properties of the communication technology to offer internet and phone
services.
Competition in the video space comes mainly from Direct Broadcast Satellite tech-
nology, a subject previously studied in detail by Goolsbee and Petrin (2004).Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004) Competition in the market for data provision comes from Digital
Subscriber Line and fiber-to-the-home technologies.
2.2.3 Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which amended the Communications Act of
1934, is the primary law regulating cable operators (as well as the rest of the telecom-
munications industry) today. The law’s main goal was to promote competition by
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removing entry restrictions in telecommunications markets. In essence, the law was
designed “to let any communications business compete in any market against any
other.”Commission (2011) Additionally, the law sought to update the FCC’s regula-
tory authority and framework to encompass the Internet.
The 1996 Act removed most price controls from the market and encouraged local
franchise authorities to allow additional firms to construct physical capital and enter
local service markets. It was believed these so-called “overbuilders,” along with entry
from telephone service providers, would provide effective competition in major mar-
kets.Padilla (2001) These overbuilders are the source of the true horizontal purchase
opportunities available to cable incumbents such as Comcast. Emmons and Prager
(1997)Emmons and Prager (1997) finds empirical evidence that this change in market
structure created increased incentives for monopoly power in the cable industry while
Kelly and Ying (2003) examined the feasibility of overbuild and concluded profitable
opportunities were rare.
Consolidation among cable providers and improvements in technology have led to
a marked decrease in the number of distribution facilities required by the industry.
Known as headends, these often unstaffed facilities receive channels through satellite
or wired networks and re-broadcast them to the local cable network. Figure Figure 2.2
shows the number of these headends has decreased by almost 40% from 1998 to 2011.
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Figure 2.2: The number of cable headends (physical locations used to recieve and
distribute programming) has decreased every year since 1998. Source: Association
(2013a)
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2.3 Model
This section introduces a flexible model of acquisitions, focusing on the valuation the
large firm makes. In our model, a large firm values individual communities individu-
ally and aggregate these valuations to value the entire set of communities served by a
small firm. An acquisition is more likely to take place if the acquirer values the com-
munities in the acquisition more than the company being acquired does, since there
exists a merger price (in between the two valuations) such that both firms benefit.
With this model in hand, we describe a simple test of the effectiveness of the HSR
threshold which we can take to our data.
2.3.1 Environment
At the beginning of each discrete time period t there is a set Jt of large firms and a
set Kt of small firms. Each firm i (where i ∈ Jt ∪Kt) operates systems which serve a
set of CUIDs Lit. There is a set of communities M and a function mt(·) which maps
CUIDs to communities for a given period t. A community c ∈ M has overbuild if
two firms each have at least one CUID in the community; that is, there exist firms
i, i′ ∈ Jt ∪Kt, i 6= i′, and CUIDs l ∈ Li, l′ ∈ Li′ , such that mt(l) = mt(l′) = c. Let
Ot(c) indicate whether community c is part of a community with overbuild at time t.
For a given community c ∈ M , let Rmt(c) be the revenue that a monopolist can
make in period t. Let Nc be the number of households who choose to subscribe in
times of monopoly. We do not make any assumptions on how Rmt(c) relates to Nc.
However, we assume the decrease in revenue from a shift to duopoly is proportional to
Nc; that is revenue decreases by θoNc if the market goes from monopoly to duopoly.
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Total revenue from any CUID l at time t is then2
Rt(l) = Rmt(mt(l))−Ot(mt(l))θoNc
Operational costs are modeled as a per-subscriber marginal cost mi and a fixed
per-period cost fi(d) that varies by firm and depends on some measure of distance d
from the CUID to the nearest other CUID that the firm owns.
In period t large firms observe which firms have operations in which communities,
and information about the small firms that is unobservable to the econometrician.
This information comes in two varieties: community-level information on the net per-
subscriber savings in marginal costs jlt and small-firm information on the fixed costs
of acquisition νjkt. jlt is drawn from a normal distribution with variance σ
2
j , j ∈ Jt
to reflect the intuition that some large firms (e.g. Comcast) produce higher gains in
efficiency.
2.3.2 Valuation
Suppose a large firm j and a small firm k meet to determine whether an acquisition of
k by j would be mutually beneficial. This amounts to determining whether j values
k’s operating systems more than k does. The difference between j’s present value
of k’s systems and k’s present value of k’s systems, which we will call DV (j, k), is
partially made up of the sum of the differences between present values vj(l) and vk(l)
of each CUID l ∈ Lk. It is also made up of the differences in j’s valuations of each of
its existing CUIDs r ∈ Lj, written as the difference between its pre-merger valuation
2For expositional and notational simplicity, we write this as if there is no difference in per-
subscriber revenue between small firms and large firms. In practice, large firms may be able to
obtain more revenue than small firms either through expansions of service or greater negotiating
power with advertisers. In our estimation, we cannot separately identify subscriber-level changes on
the cost side and the revenue side.
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vj(r) and its post-merger valuation v
′
j(r):
DV (j, k) =
(∑
l∈Lk
(vj(l)− vk(l))
)
+
∑
r∈Lj
(v′j(r)− vj(r))

It can be shown, using both the formulation for revenue and costs above as well
as the restrictions imposed by our data (detailed below), that the change in value
simplifies to
DV (j, k) = β0sk + β1{horiz}sk + F (d) + {HSR}(β2 + β3{horiz}) + jltsk + νjkt
where
sk =
∑
l∈Lk
Nmt(l)
is the number of subscribers acquired, {horiz} is a flag for a horizontal or duopoloy-
to-monopoly transition, F (d) is the fixed cost of merging as a function of the distance
d between j and k3 and {HSR} is a flag for the Hart-Scott-Rodino threshold. In
practice, we estimate F (d) according to
F (d) = α0 + α1d+ α2d
2 + ξ
A large firm j will execute an acquisition if DV (j, k) > 0. This implies the
probability of observing an acquisition follows a known distribution.
2.4 Data
In order to capture an accurate picture of the cable industry through time and under-
stand the effect of merger policy on consolidation in the cable industry, we combine
3We set d to the minimum distance between the CUIDs operated by j and the CUIDs operated
by k.
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data on cable television systems from the FCC with market-level data on household
counts from the Census and geographic location data from the United States Board on
Geographic Names to create a novel dataset. We supplement this data with Annual
Reports submitted to the FCC by cable providers, Early Termination Notices from
the FTC, a series of letters Comcast wrote to the FCC informing the Commission of
completed acquisitions, and a small number of public transaction size disclosures.
Our data on cable television systems was collected from FCC’s internet-based
Cable Operations and Licensing System (COALS) using an automated process. For
a given Community Unit (known as a CUID in FCC parlance), COALS lists the
current and previous service providers. COALS also provides access to administrative
or regulatory filings made by the system operator that relate to the cable system,
including ownership change forms and annual reports.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of the CUID ownership file. Just under half of
CUIDs undergo legal-entity changes at some point throughout the study period, and
the average number of unique parent companies responsible for a CUID was 1.85.
We identified individual acquisition events by looking at groups of CUIDs that
switched from (say) Owner A to Owner B within a short time period. We verified our
purchase identification process using data collected from a series of public disclosures
Comcast made to the FCC about its acquisitions from 2003 to 2008. We distinguish
between horizontal and conglomerate purchases with a simple process: For each CUID
involved in the event, we examined the list of the acquiring company’s existing prop-
erties at the time of the event for an exact community name match. If a match is
found, the CUID is flagged as a horizontal acquisition. The remaining purchases are
considered conglomerate.
To understand the value of controlling any particular cable system, we obtained
population and household count data from the U.S. Census at the Census Place level.
To understand the value of geographic clustering, we collected data on the location
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of the various systems (i.e. latitude and longitude) from the Gazetteer created by
the Board on Geographic Names. We matched these data to our FCC community
information by community name and county.
Finally, to understand the effect of the HSR disclosure requirement, we needed to
map the financial value requirement to the context of our community-level data. We
used limited public disclosures on acquisition prices to estimate a value of $4000 per
subscriber and use annual report and industry data to estimate subscription rates
across years. On average, the estimated acquisition value per household was $2600.
We then applied the monetary threshold of $71 million to arrive at a threshold value
of 27,000 households. While the monetary thresholds change throughout the study
period, they are tied to the rate of inflation, which should roughly track the rate of
growth in the value of a single subscriber.
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Total number of CUIDs 45,146
Average number of providers per CUID 1.85
Std. dev. 1.14
CUIDs with single provider 22,986
CUIDs with more than 5 providers 690
Table 2.1: Summary of cleaned provider data.
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of the size of the 712 acquisitions we study. This chart removes
a small number of extremely large transactions for clarity.
2.5 Acquisitions
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for our final set of 712 purchases made by
top firms, covering 15,357 communities (or CUIDs, in FCC parlance) during our
study period. Most purchases covered a relatively small area; the median number of
communities involved in a single transaction was 3 and the median population affected
was 31,123.4 Figure Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of merger size as measured in
households.
The existence of clustered purchases is immediately apparent: the average mean
4Compare to the median population of all cities and towns of the U.S. of 41,994.
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distance between CUIDs involved in an acquisition and the set of CUIDs already
owned by the acquiring firm was 4.7 miles. Since distances are calculated using
centroids, this suggests many purchases involved systems essentially adjacent to the
acquiring firm’s pre-existing properties.
Table 2.3 provides the same summary statistics for each large firm we study.
Comcast had 43% of the acquisitions covering 45% of the total acquired CUIDs and
44% of the population transferred during the period. As such, the summary statistics
for Comcast largely drive the overall numbers reported in Table 2.2. That being said,
the acquisition strategies for the other firms implied by the summary statistics are
remarkably similar. The average number of CUIDs involved in a single event are
almost identical, except for Adelphia which was impacted by its bankruptcy during
the period.
The median number of households involved in purchases was below the threshold
value of 27,000 for all firms except AT&T, suggesting a large amount of the consolida-
tion in this industry was done without regulator scrutiny. Time Warner’s significantly
larger average purchase size was driven mostly by a few very large purchases in the
New York and New England region.
Additionally, the average minimum distance between the acquired CUIDs and
the firm’s pre-existing CUIDs was also similar for all companies besides AT&T. Even
AT&T’s relatively large distance, 42.7 miles, equates to most acquisitions taking place
within a space similar in size to the average US county.5
This clustering is apparent visually. Figure Figure 2.4 shows Comcast’s holdings
by county in 2001. By 2003, shown in Figure Figure 2.5, Comcast had not just consol-
idated its holdings in places such as Florida, it had also bought clustered operations
in the Mountain West. Finally, by 2010 (Figure Figure 2.6) Comcast had expanded to
5In fact, this large distance is largely driven by a single acquisition 560 miles from the nearest
AT&T-owned CUID.
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Figure 2.4: Map of Comcast’s holdings by county in 2001. Counties are red if Comcast
serves at least one community in the county.
the market leadership position largely through additional regional purchases. In this
way, as shown in Figure Figure 2.7, Comcast has expanded its reach from roughly 10
million households to over 60 million by 2013. This implies that today, over 50% of
households are in Comcast’s territory (Figure Figure 2.8).
2.5.1 Horizontal acquisitions
Of the 15,357 CUIDs that were acquired by one of the large firms during the study
period, 190 were considered horizontal purchases. These 190 switches were part of 74
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Figure 2.5: Map of Comcast’s holdings by county in 2003. Counties are red if Comcast
serves at least one community in the county.
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Figure 2.6: Map of Comcast’s holdings by county in 2010. Counties are red if Comcast
serves at least one community in the county.
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Figure 2.7: The number of households within Comcast’s franchise territory (as iden-
tified through our PSID/Census match process) has increased steadily throughout
our study period. The large jumps in 2002 and 2006 are the result of the AT&T
Broadband and Adelphia acquisitions, respectively. Quarterly household counts are
imputed using 2010 Census levels and 2000-2010 growth rates by county.
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Figure 2.8: The percentage of households within Comcast’s franchise territory (as
identified through our PSID/Census match process) has increased steadily throughout
our study period. The large jumps in 2002 and 2006 are the result of the Adelphia and
Susquehanna acquisitions, respectively. Quarterly household counts and percentages
are imputed using 2010 Census levels and 2000-2010 growth rates by county.
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distinct acquisition events – 10% of the total number of events seen.
Within the 74 events that included a horizontal component, the median percentage
of CUIDs involved in the purchase that were considered horizontal was 12.5%. The
mean was 33.2%. Several small purchases that consisted of a completely horizontal
takeover contributed significantly to this mean – these tended to be municipality-run
networks that were sold.
Of the 23 acquisitions with more than 50% of the CUIDs considered horizontal,
the median number of households involved was 24,504, implying that many of these
purchases required disclosure and scrutiny under HSR.
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Number of mergers 712
Median CUIDs per merger 3
Average CUIDs per merger 21.6
Std. Dev. CUIDs per merger 82.6
Median mean distance to nearest owned CUID .267
Average mean distance to nearest owned CUID 4.66
Std. Dev. of minimum distance to nearest owned CUID 29.98
Total CUIDs acquired 15,357
CUIDs missing population data 3,894
Median population per merger 31,123
Average population per merger 540,510.4
Std. Dev population per merger 2,861,357
Median households per merger 12,637
Average households per merger 201,099.4
Std. Dev households per merger 1,029,455
Table 2.2: Acquisition summary. Note: Household statistics include missing data for
some rural CUIDs.
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2.6 Suggestive Evidence
The data presented in the previous section lend themselves to two clear hypotheses:
1. Outside of true horizontal purchases, Hart-Scott-Rodino has little effect on
merger strategy.
2. Firms place a high value on “near-horizontal” or highly-clustered acquisitions.
Both of these hypotheses are testable. First, if HSR filing rules place a major
burden on transactions over a certain size, large firms should be less willing to pursue
those transactions, relative to the opportunities available in the marketplace. Sec-
ond, if firms value clustered systems, they should be more willing to pursue those
transactions relative to the available opportunities.
To test these hypotheses, we ran a simple exercise. For each year in our study
period, we created a list of cable systems the large firms could have acquired based
on the ownership records.
We then used a simple logistic regression to estimate the probability of a suc-
cessful acquisition event based on the size of the acquisition and the percentage of
the potential purchase’s horizontality based upon the acquiring firm’s presence in
the communities involved at the time of the purchase. We added a dummy variable
representing the necessity of Hart-Scott-Rodino disclosure, as well as year dummy
variables to reflect changing macroeconomic conditions.
The most important decision in the execution of this exercise is the selection of
the decision set available to the firms. The main decisions essentially boil down to
the following questions:
1. Can firms partially acquire firms? How do we determine the possible subsets?
2. What level of horizontality is allowed?
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3. Can firms acquire other large firms?
4. Should potential targets acquired by other large firms be included?
The first question essentially defines the cardinality of the set. Though partial
acquisitions do occur, they are relatively rare. Additionally, many partial acquisitions
lead to further transactions with the same target later in the study period – meaning
the “cumulative size” portion of the HSR rules applies. For this reason, we opt
to model acquisitions as absolute: you either buy the whole company, or you buy
nothing.6
Since we observe several truly horizontal purchases in the data, we allow any level
of horizontality in our potential purchase set. Additionally, since the only “purchase”
of a large firm (Adelphia purchased by Comcast and Time Warner) was the result of
a bankruptcy process, we do not allow the large firms to acquire each other.
The final question is also the most vexing. Unfortunately, we have no data cov-
ering behind-the-scenes overtures and negotiations, so we are unable to observe (for
instance) targets of mutual interest, bidding wars, and other types of strategic activ-
ity. Therefore, we estimate the model with several variants of the data representing
alternative answers to this question.
The first variant treats all large firms as members of a hypothetical larger firm
we call the “megafirm.” In this variant, we calculate the distance variables according
to the nearest distance to any cable system owned by any of the megafirm’s “sub-
sidiaries.” In the second variant, we estimate separate models for the individual firms
but exclude any company acquired by other firms from the set of potential purchases
available to the firm in question. This assumes any negotiation process acts as a
truth-telling device and large firms with the highest internal valuation always have
the first option to purchase small concerns. In essence, if Firm B acquires Firm C,
6An alternative interpretation of this assumption is: you either execute a transaction with the
firm or not.
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that event is viewed as evidence that Firm C was never truly an option for Firm A.
In the third variant, we estimate separate models for each of the major firms and
allow them the possibility of acquiring any other firm in the market. This assumes
the negotiation process may break down and firms may end up acquiring a target
despite a different firm’s higher valuation. Furthermore, if Firm B acquires only some
CUID operations of Firm C, then we reason that this subset of Firm C’s CUID’s was
also a potential purchase by Firm A.
The results for the “megafirm” specification are shown in Table 2.4. Parameter
estimates for the second and third variations are shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6
respectively. For clarity, we discuss the results related to each of the hypotheses in
separate subsections.
2.6.1 Does Hart-Scott-Rodino have an effect?
Across our specifications, a couple of patterns emerge. First, the HSR disclosure flag
on its own has a positive coefficient and is highly significant. This implies that firms
aren’t dissuaded from pursuing large acquisitions by the HSR rules alone. However,
when interacted with the horizontal flag, HSR disclosure has a negative effect, though
the effect is much less significant. While we refuse to believe regulators do not scruti-
nize large mergers with a strong horizontal component, this suggests such scrutiny is
not particularly burdensome, particularly compared with the benefits of horizontality
as measured by the horizontal flag on its own.
2.6.2 How important is clustering?
Though the minimum distance parameter is not significant in any estimation apart
from for AT&T Broadband, the parameter is negative in every specification estimated.
This suggests that while firms pursue purchases that are located close to their current
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(1)
acquired
Mean Distance -0.00673
(0.00826)
Horizontal Flag 0.388
(0.259)
HSR Flag 1.270∗∗∗
(0.0919)
HSR * Horizontal -0.641∗
(0.317)
[1em] Num. Households 0.000000133∗
(6.47e-08)
Year Dummies Yes
Constant -4.665∗∗∗
(0.167)
N 39813
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Parameter estimates for the “megafirm” specification of our ‘potential
merger’ exercise.
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holdings, it is not an overwhelming factor in their decision. Alternatively, given the
relative crudity of our distance measure, it is possible our model is insufficiently
nuanced to capture the true value. An ideal measure of distance would combine
a concept of adjacency and the amount of right-of-way needed to combine physical
systems.
2.7 Conclusion and future work
Although many have tried to measure the effectiveness of U.S. merger policy in an
empirical way, these attempts have largely been stymied by the problem of sample
size.Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2011); Carlton (2009). This project has attempted
to cast the problem into the context of a specific industry, cable television service, in
order to achieve enough variation to provide an empirically robust answer.
The results of our simple ‘potential acquisition’ exercise suggest policy may be too
focused on particular types of acquisitions without considering the industry at large.
In particular, it is not difficult to imagine that regulators in 1999 may have rejected
a proposal to combine the cable television access of 50% of U.S. households into a
single company.7 Yet this is precisely what has occurred.8
While this paper lays out the acquisition history and strategy of the largest players
in the cable provider market, it cannot fully answer questions about the effectiveness
of U.S. merger policy. To that end, we have developed a structural model of firm
acquisition to produce a truly robust and coherent quantitative look at both the
effect of HSR and the benefits of clustering without the cavalcade of assumptions we
have used in our ‘potential acquisition’ exercise.
7If this thought experiment does not convince you, consider a proposal to combine cable television,
internet, and voice services for 50% of American households into a single company that also controls
a quarter of the broadcast television market.
8To be clear, we are not making any claims about consumer or firm welfare through this period
of consolidation. Rather, we believe regulators may have opted for additional scrutiny.
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The next steps in the execution of this agenda include incorporating of Cable
Factbook data into our acquisition dataset, followed by estimating our structural
model using the techniques established in PPHI. With our structural model estimated,
we can investigate several counterfactuals, including different regulatory regimes for
acquisitions and alternative distance integration costs.
2.8 Appendix: Data details
Our main sources of data are the U.S. Census Bureau and the Cable Operations
and Licensing System (COALS), operated by the FCC. We also obtained information
on Early Terminations from the Federal Trade Commission and supplemented our
procedures with several additional sources. This appendix gives details of our various
data collection and processing procedures.
2.8.1 Early Terminations
The Federal Trade Commission maintains lists of all early terminations granted each
week under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.9 We manually searched these lists for events
that included the large firms we were concerned with.
2.8.2 Comcast Letters
As part of a public comment period on proposed ownership rules in the cable industry,
Comcast voluntarily submitted quarterly letters detailing their acquisition activity to
the FCC, which subsequently published them on their website. We collected all of
the letters available.
9Available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/earlyterm
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2.8.3 Geographic Data
We obtained population data at the Census Place10 level from the National Historical
Geographic Information System for Census 2000 and 2010 and augmented this data
with 2010 data directly from the Census Bureau. For a city that crosses county lines,
population counts are available for each “county-part” of the city while household
counts are only available for the city as a whole. We imputed 2010 household counts
for multi-county cities by taking the city-wide ratio of households to population and
multiplying it by the population of each “county-part.” Population and household
counts were also available for the balance of counties (or other civil divisions) that
are unincorporated – similar to the FCC community classifications described below.
We estimated the 2010 household counts for unincorporated communities by using
a simple linear regression of household count on total population interacted with state
dummies for all communities for which household data was available. We then used
the growth rates of household counts by county from 2000-2010 to impute CUID
household counts from 2000-2010.
Finally, we incorporated latitude and longitude data from the State Gazetteer
prepared by the United States Board on Geographic Names,11 matching by place name
and the Census’ internal unique identifiers. Where exact matches weren’t available, we
used the geographical centroid of the containing county or township.12 Additionally,
several manual links were made to account for changes in the definitions of certain
political units (i.e. changes in county and city boundaries) throughout the country
during our study period.
10This includes Census Designated Places
11Available at http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/fips55codedef.html
12This ensures every CUID can be included in distance calculations.
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2.8.4 COALS
Overview of COALS and FCC identifiers
COALS consists of a database of cable system information, with a publicly accessible
front end, as well as secured-access options for cable systems owners and administra-
tors.13
Cable systems regulated by the FCC (and collected in COALS) are identified
through Physical System Identification numbers (PSIDs) and the communities they
service are identified through Community Unit Identification numbers (CUIDs). In
towns where more than one physical system operates, multiple CUIDs are created.
Additional CUIDs may also be created when towns cross county lines. For example,
the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota, which is currently served by Comcast, is assigned
a single CUID, MN0180. That CUID is “owned” by PSID 011339, which serves the
greater Twin Cities area. On the other hand, Kansas City, Missouri, which spans four
separate counties, is host to five separate CUIDs serviced by three PSIDs representing
Comcast, Time Warner, and Surewest. The presence of two CUIDs with identical
community names does not necessarily imply true overbuild; many of these cases
occur in large geographic areas, such as the non-incorporated portions of counties.
CUIDs may also represent unincorporated areas and communities at a variety
of scales. At the low end of the spectrum, a single CUID may represent a single
‘private’ settlement such as an apartment complex or hotel. A CUID may be created
for an unincorporated community regardless of Census status. A single CUID may
also be used to represent the ‘balance’ of a county: the total area of that county not
included in any incorporated city contained within that county. Table 2.7 shows the
distribution of CUIDs by FCC community type classification.
13COALS is available at https://apps.fcc.gov/coals/
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Figure 2.9: A screenshot of the COALS page for the cable system in Minneapolis
Minnesota, with emphasis on the providers and filings information we scraped.
Data Collection
Our data collection process begins with a exhaustive list of every CUID in the United
States, taken from an FCC-provided current-status digest.14 This CUID list is used as
the input to a Python script which opens the public COALS page, parses the source
HTML, and saves relevant information on providers and filings.15 The primary output
of this script is a dataset of every CUID/provider combination in the COALS system.
Merging COALS and Census Data
With our geographic data and CUID data collected at the finest levels possible, we use
a “specific-to-general” process to combine the data. We map the Census Place classi-
14Available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/vax/registeredcuid.xls
15See figure Figure 2.9 for an example CUID shown in COALS.
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fications to the FCC CUID classifications according to Table 2.8. We then match the
community type and the community, county, and state names as closely as possible.
An overview of the match quality is tabulated in Table 2.9. Of the 45,146 CUIDs in
the FCC file, we match 31,598 to Census locations. Of those 31,598 matches, 5,517
are unincorporated communities and therefore use imputed household data. Though
all major cities match successfully, the CUID file contains many unmatched entries.
While some of the unmatched CUIDs consist of individual housing developments or
government facilities, most are unincorporated communities or areas which do not
qualify as a Census Designated Place.
2.8.5 Data cleaning
The first step in our analysis is a manual cleaning process focusing on the 9,506
unique legal entities that control CUIDs at various points in time throughout our
raw dataset. The vast majority of the changes come from either missing address
information or typographical errors in the legal name or address.16 Many additional
changes are made through the identification of franchised or otherwise split legal
entities which are in fact owned by a single corporation. These entities were identi-
fied either through analysis of their names or publicly available business databases
maintained by Business Week and Funding Universe.17 We also used SEC filings to
identify lists of subsidiaries in 2000.18The result of this process is a mapping that
links each of the 9,506 “raw” legal entities to one of “cleaned” 3,889 entities. These
cleaned entities are then merged back into the original providers dataset.
With the legal entities cleaned, it is now the case that several “switches” in a
single CUID may now actually be multiple entries of the same parent company. We
16See figure Figure 2.10 for examples of these two cases.
17Figure Figure 2.11 has examples of this sort of cleaning.
18Comcast: http://www.cmcsa.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=950159-00-66
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Municipality Type CUIDs
Incorporated Borough 1,733
Incorporated City 10,873
Incorporated Town 8,878
Incorporated Village 4,211
Privately owned settlement 1,072
State or Federal Reservation 440
Unincorporated area adjacent to incorporated community 1,478
Unincorporated area commonly known as 5,809
Unincorporated unnamed area within a County or Parish 4,211
Grand Total 45,146
Table 2.7: CUID types identified by the FCC
CUID classification CDP classification
Incorporated Borough City
Incorporated City City
Incorporated Town Town
Incorporated Village Town
Privately owned settlement Private
State or Federal Reservation Reservation
Unincorporated area adjacent to incorporated community Balance
Unincorporated area commonly known as CDP
Unincorporated unnamed area within a County or Parish Balance
Table 2.8: Mapping CUID classifications to CDP classifications
Match Type CUIDs
Full (County, community type and name) 21,158
County and name 5,610
Type and name 2,210
Name only 2,620
Unmatched 13,548
Total 45,146
Table 2.9: Breakdown of CUID/Census match quality
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Figure 2.10: Top: Some legal entity entries were missing address data. We filled
in missing addresses using entries with identical names where available. Bottom:
When multiple addresses were found (or when addresses had typos), we used the
most-common entry for all identically named entities.
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Figure 2.11: Top: Some legal entity differences came from subsidiaries with slightly
different names. Bottom: Many cable operators operate through franchised or
regionally-based subsidiaries.
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perform a sifting procedure on the dataset to identify the earliest date a CUID was
controlled by each of the legal entities which ever controlled the community during
the period covered by COALS data. The result is a pared-down list of unique legal
entities controlling CUIDs at different points in time.
We refactor this list into a set of switches, by combining multiple observations in
our source data into a single observation for each switch containing information on
the prior owner, the new owner, and the date of the switch. We group these switches
by the two owners in question and the calendar quarter of the switch to identify
mergers. These so-called “switch groups” represent the universe of possible merger
events in our data.
These groups require additional manual cleaning. Although FCC rules require
cable providers to inform the FCC of changes in the legal status of a CUID or cable
system within 30 days of such a change,19 we find several instances where the bulk of
a change is consummated (according to the COALS providers data) on one day, and
a few additional changes are made some days or months later. An example of this
phenomenon is shown in Table 2.10. This process reduces the number of observed
switch groups (and thus the number of mergers we report) from 896 to 713.
As a check on our data cleaning procedures, we compare our final Comcast merger
list (including dates) to the data we collected from the Comcast letters. We success-
fully match nearly all of the 119 reported Comcast acquisitions.20
To understand the geographic layout of the merger, we compare the distance of
each CUID within a switch group with all of the CUIDs owned by the acquiring
company at the time of the switch (excluding other CUIDs acquired within the same
group). Distances are calculated from latitude/longitude data with the Equirectan-
1947 C.F.R 76.1610, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2010-title47-
vol4/pdf/CFR-2010-title47-vol4-sec76-1610.pdf
20We believe our mismatches are due to differences in the names of entities as reported by Comcast
and recorded in COALS.
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gular Approximation which has high accuracy over the relatively short distances we
observe.
2.8.6 Horizontal purchases
We distinguish between horizontal and conglomerate purchases with a simple process:
For each CUID involved in the acquisition event, we examined the list of the acquiring
company’s existing properties at the time of the merger for an exact community name
match. If a match is found, the CUID is flagged as a potential horizontal merger.
Since we cannot confirm overbuild directly, we excluded those CUIDS which referred
to townships or unincorporated areas of counties and parishes. It is unlikely that
companies would pursue an overbuild strategy in these rural areas.
2.8.7 FCC Annual Report Data
To ground our subscription rate assumptions, we acquired all annual report data
from 2002-2009 from the FCC. The FCC requires all cable systems with greater than
20,000 subscribers, as well as a random sample of smaller systems, to submit an
annual report with details of their coverage, subscription rates, and offerings. These
reports are filed at the Physical System level and are integrated into COALS upon
submission. While this data is considered public, the FCC has agreed to an industry
request to hold the report data for three years before release.
Unfortunately, due to the design of COALS, the annual report data does not
contain any point-in-time geographic linkage information. In other words, we cannot
identify which historical annual report corresponds to which CUIDs. Whenever a
CUID is attached to a new PSID, it is immediately linked to all filings for that PSID
and all previous linkages are destroyed. For example, Verizon registered a CUID
for Medford, MA (CUID MA0484) in 2012 and attached it to their existing regional
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PSID, 020666. COALS lists a 2008 annual report as a relevant filing for this CUID,
despite the CUID’s failure to exist in that year. Unfortunately, there does not seem
to be a solution to this obstacle at this time.21
While we cannot precisely identify which physical systems controlled which CUIDs,
we regress the number of subscribers on the number of households covered by the
system interacted with year dummies. This regression captures the overall decline
in cable subscription rates and is used to ground the value assumptions made in our
potential merger exercise.
21We asked the FCC to release any geographic link data (beyond the “present-time view” available
in COALS) they possess under the Freedom of Information Act. Mike Perko, the Chief of the FCC’s
Office of Communications and Industry Information, asserted no such information existed, and
that storing such information was “not in the public interest.” Since the lack of such information
significantly reduces the usefulness of annual report data and hampers the FCC’s ability to make
informed decisions, we must disagree.
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Date CUIDs
January 15, 2008 364
April 25, 2008 2
August 1, 2008 2
Total 368
Table 2.10: An example of different dates within a “switch group.” The event shown
took place between Comcast and Insight Communications Co.
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